The Diversity of Land Institutions in Europe - Working Paper

In previous reviews, we have already seen the importance of inheritance law and land titling on development outcomes. Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken's paper  "The Diversity of Land Institutions in Europe" looks at land institutions related to farming in EU context and shows both the large diversity within a single market and how policy decisions can have large effects in relatively short periods of time.

Abstract:     

"The creation of optimal land institutions attracted renewed attention in the 1990s because of its central role in the transition process in former Communist countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and more recently because of large-scale land investments in developing countries. This paper documents the existence of large variations in land institutions (markets and regulation) using current and historical data from Western and Eastern Europe. It then offers explanations for these differences and draws implications for the role and optimality of land institutions in development (with special reference to the current debate on large scale land acquisitions)"

 

It is interesting to see how much diversity there is among EU countries, both within the EU15 and former communist, specially in a setting where there is not only a common market but also a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). These differences not only point at history but also to more recent policy decisions in land restitution (former communist), rental environment, and farmland regulatory framework. While the study does look at land institutions per se, it is a pity there has not been a deeper look at the impact of the CAP on those institutions, aside from a passing mention in the case of Greece (the requirement of rental agreements have led to an increase in formalization).

This also shows that there are many paths to a functional agricultural land market and that both institutional design and political/policy considerations loom large. Land reform is still in the agenda of many developing countries, although not as much in its traditional shape (social justice) and rather as economic (mostly export led) growth argument. The acceptance of multiple pathways with endogenous development within a common external framework reinforces the point that 'cookie cutter' policy proposals by external actors are a misrepresentation of the policy options at hand

 

Interesting to note that one of the largest countries both in farmland and agricultural production within the EU, Spain, is not part of the analysis. The authors do not give an explanation so we are left guessing. Selection bias? quality of data?

 

 

 

 

Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade - Job Market Paper

Industrial policy is always a contentious argument in development economics between free-marketers and state intervention. Réka Juhász's Job Market Paper "TemporaryProtection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade" brings historical evidence to that debate through an interesting natural experiment from the early 19th century.

Abstract

"This paper uses a natural experiment to assess whether temporary protection from trade with industrial leaders can foster development of infant industries in follower countries. Using a new dataset compiled from primary sources, I find that in the short-run regions (départements) in the French Empire which became better protected from trade with the British for exogenous reasons during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) increased capacity in a new technology, mechanised cotton spinning, to a larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. Temporary protection had long term effects. In particular, by exploiting the fact that the post-war location of the cotton industry was determined to a large extent by the historical accident of the wars, I first show that the location of cotton spinning within France was persistent, and firms located in regions with higher post-war spinning capacity were more productive 30 years later. Second, I find that after the restoration of peace, exports of cotton goods from France increased substantially, consistent with evolving comparative advantage in cottons. Third, I show that as late as 1850, France and Belgium - both part of the French Empire prior to 1815 - had larger cotton spinning industries than other Continental European countries which were not protected from British trade during the wars; this suggests that adoption of the new technology was far from inevitable."

Interestingly, the paper studies the effects of an event and policy that was not designed for industrial purposes: the Napoleonic Wars and the Continental Blockade. While the Continental Blockade had the foreign policy purpose of undermining Britain's trade advantage/power and not necessarily a protectionist measure for French industry (in this case cotton). Probably the most interesting case may be that of Belgium and not that of France. During the Napoleonic Wars, Belgium was under French control (1794-1815) until it became part of the Netherlands. However, cotton industry grew more in Belgium than in the Netherlands in the post-Napoleonic period.. pointing out to the second issue: Technology Adoption

The results show there may be some role to be played for protectionist policies for infant industries not only to establish productive capacity but also the be able to adopt/adapt new technologies more successfully. On the other hand, the temporary protection was not sector-specific but across the board, leading to the interpretation that industrial policy may be more effective by focusing on the general environment rather than specific industries, allowing for an efficient internal reallocation of resources.

To note that the study focuses on a successful case and does not look at the industries that may have been wiped out after the lifting of the blockade, so we should be careful in making general economic welfare interpretations at country level.

Compulsory Schooling Laws and Formation of Beliefs (?) - Research Paper

While I find the initial results from this paper appealing (confirmation bias?), Pogorelova and Mocan's "Compulsory Schooling Laws and Formation of Beliefs: Education,Religion and Superstition" does present me with some questions. Abstract below:

"We exploit information on compulsory schooling reforms in 11 European countries, implemented in the 1960s and 70s, to identify the impact of education on religious adherence and religious practices. Using micro data from the European Social Survey, conducted in various years between 2002 and 2013, we find consistently large negative effects of schooling on self-reported religiosity, social religious acts (attending religious services), as well as solitary religious acts (the frequency of praying). We also use data from European Values Survey to apply the same empirical design to analyze the impact of schooling on superstitious beliefs. We find that more education, due to increased mandatory years of schooling, reduces individuals’ tendency to believe in the power of lucky charms and the tendency to take into account horoscopes in daily life."

The 11 countries under study for religiosity were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, United Kingdom, Poland, Spain, and West Germany (for the horoscope analysis they only used Austria, France, Greece and Germany). Other countries were not included for methodological reasons. These countries actually give us a wide European cross-section, from Catholic to Protestant and Orthodox, from dictatorships or under Soviet control (at the time of the reform) to democracies, from northern Europe to the Mediterranean. And yet, we have to be careful in extrapolating to non-European contexts (a large gains schooling in Africa and Asia are due to religious schools)

 Firstly, I would say that the study measures religious practice rather than beliefs, unless you count in superstition (depending on your view of religion), that measures both belief and practice. 

It measures two very specific cohorts, maybe it should also do a comparison with overall trends in religiosity or with younger and older cohorts. The period under-study was a major turning point for the Catholic Church (many of the countries analyzed have large Catholic populations) with the Second Vatican Council, that changed rules and norms among Catholics on religious practice and to this day still has open discussions. The Council itself was a response to calls to modernization (and maybe address a trend that the study correlates with schooling)
 

Another point to note is that in many of the countries studied, religious institutions are/where important providers of schooling at the time of the reform. The reform itself could have diminished the influence of religious providers either because of expansion of public schools (I know in Spain the reform was coupled with a wave of school construction), the lack of capacity to actually cover the extra (or two) years of schooling or actual decline of religious/denominational schools (the number Catholic schools in Europe declined 18% between 1975 and 2000)

Measuring superstition is always a tricky affair, are lucky charms and horoscopes (in four countries) sufficient indicators? 

How does schooling and religiosity correlate with other values or beliefs? nationalism, conservatism, capitalism, belief in aliens, etc..?

HT to Chris Blattman