Iran's
Nuclear talks have recently been extended, whether because Rouhani's engagement
or the late rapprochement between USA and Iran due to Daesh/ISIL still remains
to be seen. Bastani's "How Powerful is Rouhani in the Islamic Republic?"
has a look at the power dynamics within the Iranian government around two key
points: President Rouhani's standing vis a vis Supreme Leader Khamenei, and
secondly the how the nuclear talks shape does dynamics.
This is
an interesting paper that reminds us that while leadership is important,
aligning interest groups (in a wider sense) and coalition building are
fundamental for actual policy change.
Introduction
"One
of the key questions being asked about the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear
programme is how powerful President Hassan Rouhani really is within Iran’s
unique political system. In other words, in a country where the key
power-holder is the Supreme Leader, do Rouhani and his colleagues have the
ability to advance their agenda and implement an international nuclear
agreement despite their powerful opponents? This question is of particular
importance because during the presidency of pro-reform Mohammad Khatami,
Rouhani was in charge of the nuclear talks and reached an important arrangement
with the international community, suspending uranium enrichment and opening
nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections; a few
years later, however, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was unhappy with the attitude of
the Western powers towards Iran, halted the implementation of these
arrangements.
With this
historical perspective in mind, an examination of the balance of power in Iran
under Rouhani’s presidency, and a review of the tools at his disposal and those
in the hands of his powerful rivals, is critical. This paper examines Rouhani’s
chief priorities in the domestic and foreign domains; analyses the factors that
help, and those that impede, his administration in attaining its goals; and
assesses the relationship between the president and Iran’s other institutions
of power, including his influence on the country’s security apparatus. Finally,
the effects of the possible success and failure of the Rouhani administration,
particularly in respect of the nuclear dossier as its most important priority,
will be examined.
It should
be noted that the focus of this paper is on the power balance within the
Iranian regime. An examination of the role of the elite and of the discontented
masses in the overall picture would require a separate study"
Summary
from the paper below the fold
- One of
the key questions about the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme is how powerful
President Hassan Rouhani really is within Iran’s unique political system, and
whether he and his colleagues have the ability to implement an international
nuclear agreement despite their powerful opponents. As the country’s chief
nuclear negotiator in 2003–05, Rouhani agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and
open nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, but
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, unhappy with the attitude of the Western powers towards
Iran, halted the implementation of these arrangements.
- Rouhani
and his associates emphasize that their objective is the resolution of the
economic, administrative and international crises arising from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s
two presidential terms. In this context, they regard their highest priority as
being the conclusion of an agreement with the international community over the
nuclear dossier – which has been, in their view, the major source of Iran’s
economic problems in the past few years.
-
However, the president is faced with opposition within the ranks of some of the
most influential state institutions: the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and
Basij volunteer militias, the intelligence - security apparatus, the judiciary
and the parliament.
- There
is no doubt that Ayatollah Khamenei expects Rouhani to strive to achieve the
removal of the sanctions against Iran, but he does not seem interested in
sharing responsibility for any retreat from the nuclear programme. If he comes
to the conclusion that the political costs of nuclear talks far outweigh the
economic benefits they can bring, he will once again put an end to them.
- Should that happen, it will strengthen Ayatollah Khamenei’s convictions about the dangers of any rapprochement with the West and about the potential for moderation in foreign policy. This impact could be even stronger than that of the failure of the 2003–05 nuclear talks.
-
Ultimately, if those in Iran – such as President Rouhani – who favour
interaction with the international community again fail in their efforts to
strike a face-saving deal, they will never be able to return to the sphere of
foreign policy in Iran. The departure of Rouhani’s team from the political
scene during the most sensitive stage of the nuclear issue would lead to the
return to Iran’s foreign policy apparatus of forces that oppose external
engagement.
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