The Effect of HIV Infection Risk Beliefs on Risky Sexual Behaviors: Scared Straight or Scared to Death? - Job Market Paper

Much of the development work is about behavior change, the assumption that with extra resources and knowledge people (also known as beneficiaries) will do things better in the future. Nowadays there is an increasing shift towards the 'at-risk' label (although 'vulnerable' is still going strong) to justify targeting: youth at-risk, women at-risk, children at-risk. However, Kerwin's job market paper "The Effect of HIV Infection Risk Beliefs on Risky Sexual Behaviors: ScaredStraight or Scared to Death?" suggests that we may be wrongly identifying both target groups and responses.

Abstract

"Economists typically assume that risk compensation is uniformly self-protective - that people become more careful as the health risks of their actions increase. However, risk-seeking, or fatalistic, responses can also be rational: increased risks can lead people to take fewer precautions. I extend the typical model of risk compensation to show that fatalism is a rational response to sufficiently high risks if people do not have perfect control over all possible exposures, and if the condition in question is irreversible. This result holds even for people who do not understand how to add up probabilities. I test this model's implications by randomizing the provision of information on HIV transmission risks to people in Malawi, a country with a severe HIV epidemic where there is qualitative evidence of fatalistic responses to the virus.

Average risk responses are self-protective and statistically significant, but small in magnitude: the mean risk elasticity of sexual behavior is roughly -0.6. To test the model of rational fatalism,I develop a method of decomposing 2SLS estimates of the risk elasticity of sexual behavior by baseline risk beliefs. Consistent with the predictions of my theoretical framework, I find that this elasticity varies sharply by baseline risk beliefs: the risk elasticity varies from -2.3 for the lowest initial beliefs to 2.9 for the highest initial beliefs. 13.8% of the population has a positive elasticity, suggesting they are fatalistic."

While the study focuses on HIV, how we handle 'at risk' groups is conceptually similar across the sectors. In most cases, targets are identified according to socioeconomic status, employment, location, age and other indicators of potential risk. The advantage of this method is that is relatively easy to identify people with this criteria. The study adds yet another criteria: fatalism, an indicator extremely relevant and yet very difficult to measure (somehow some behaviors can be used as proxy). A fatalist view will not attempt to mitigate the risks but rather embrace them and assume the worst already, making traditional risk education infective (as it tends to highlight negatives as a preventive methodology).

We see a similar issue regarding suicide bombers, gang membership and other high risk behaviors, where the at-risk profile is wide enough to include thousands (if not millions) and yet the actual number of joining are well below. Maybe what we need is better psychological profiling in order to be more precise in both identifying beneficiaries and tailoring the message.

HT to Development Impact

Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities - Working Paper

While, in general, I am not keen on social science results coming out of controlled lab experiments, Engel and Rockenbach's "Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities" offer an interesting though with potential large implications (if proven by field testing) for development practitioners.

 
Abstract:  

"We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions when it would be most desirable, i.e. with a positive externality. Here, participants vote for high contributions, yet compliance is poor. Unfavorable payoff comparisons to the outsiders that gain a windfall profit drive contributions down."

In many development interventions, specially with the popularity of Community Driven Development (CDD), communities are asked to chose priorities and, in some cases, also contribute to them. Those priorities usually reflect public goods (or rather public services that can have a public good component, like schools, medical posts, markets, community centers) that do have externalities on other communities (or even within the community). Unfortunately, in development we tend to treat externalities either as a risk (other communities/actors reacting negatively, spoilers) or as a multiplier-effect (bonus points because there is a positive spill-over beyond the community) but rarely as something integral to the design of the decision-making process and the community contribution (both at initial stage and on running costs).

The study shows that enforcement of decisions is key (nothing new there) but also that voting and the nature of the externality have an effect on contributions: If negative it lowers (acknowledgement of impact on others?), if positive it also lowers!! (why should we pay for those free riders?) and if neutral increases (it is all ours?).

In my view policy implications are multiple: 

1) we need to field test this hypothesis, 

2) we may need to tailor decision-making processes and corresponding contributions according to externalities (assuming we want to maximize community contribution). Of course this is easier said that done, specially in CDD settings where the prioritization outcome is not necessarily known beforehand (although the guessing can be quite narrow),

3) extend voting to all contributors. While this point is not looked into by the study, the fact that there might be contributor not participating in the decision-making (indirectly so, through the non-binding phase), we can assume that shifting them from semi-bystanders to decision-makers/contributors would increase the compliance (a point made in many studies in political science on broadening the voting franchise AND the tax base),

4) in stable systems, both and positive negative externalities are dealt by shifting the decision-making process to a higher level (district, region, nation) that can provide for a compensatory system (insurance, investments, balancing out positive and negative externalities). However, in many development settings a 'bump-up the ladder' is not an efficient option (and a whole different 'governance' debate). Clustering (identifying and including affected parties) for decision-making and contributions (in the case of positive externalities) would make the public good neutral (and raise contributions). For negative externalities it is much harder unless the potential damage has been pre-identified and a compensatory mechanism already established (i.e. another development project in the affected community, mitigation measures).

School Competition and Product Differentiation - Job Market Paper

School competition is widely presented as a model for improving educational outcomes. Ongoing debates on school vouchers, charter schools and the role of private education show an increased focus on the use of market forces in the education sector. Bau's "School Competition and Product Differentiation" takes a slightly different approach, instead of the 'traditional' comparison between public and private schools, she looks into the effect of competition within the private sector.

Abstract

"Policies that encourage school competition in hopes of improving school quality are increasingly popular in both rich and poor countries. In this paper, I establish that schools may respond to increased competition by catering to wealthier students, at the expense of poorer students. I develop a model of school competition in the presence of differential information.

If (1) the match between a school and a student affects learning, and (2) wealthier students' enrollment decisions are more responsive to their match to schools, then schools cater more to the needs of wealthy students. Therefore, the entry of an additional school can reduce the quality of the match for poorer students. I show that the key mechanism of the theoretical model - that wealthier student are more responsive to their predicted test score gains when choosing schools - is consistent with the data by estimating a structural model of school choice in Pakistan. Exploiting the exit and entry of private schools and an instrumental variable that affects the cost of opening a private school, I find that competition increases private schools' targeting of wealthy students and reduces their targeting of poor students. An additional private school in the market increases within-school inequality in yearly test score gains by 0.1 standard deviations."

Many arguments promoting school competition are framed as pro-poor (elitist arguments are bad form these days), however the study shows that there might be diminishing returns and actually reduce learning for already enrolled poor students. Unfortunately the author does not follow up on one stark implication: the increased focus on wealthier students when the competition rises (as indicated in her own model). Therefore the issue does not seem to be informational (poor students choices are a worse match) as stated, but rather the schools own focus. These two issues might need to be disentangled further.

An interesting note, especially for fans of path-dependence, is that the presence of private schools is correlated to girls' government secondary school in the village (promoted mainly in 1980s through the Pakistan Social Action Program). Secondary-school educated young women are a key labor source for private school teaching, bringing on board another variable for education policy and territorial coverage of competition.

HT Development Impact

Interesting links

Interesting links of the week

- Winning elections one knock at a time, the importance of ground work/canvassing.

- Skeptics guide to institutions, 4 parts so far.

- Spain ranks highest in financial access according to this new study

- Chinese military classics on the economics of peace and war

- The myth of Armchair Socialist debunked?

- Development professionals and their (our) behavioral biases

What is Title Guarantee Worth in Land Markets? Evidence from Bengaluru, India - Working Paper

Land reform has been a constant topic not only on development literature but also in economics and politics for many years. Many popular movements (specially agrarian) have been focused on land distribution and ownership, although in later years the theme has been losing visibility (partly due to the diminishing role of agriculture in many economies, partly due to its association with 'marxist' movements vis a vis 'free market'). On the other hand the issue of titling urban settings, specially in relation to squatter/slums in developing countries has garnered more recent attention (probably it most well known leader being Peruvian Hernando De Soto). Venkataraman's "What is Title Guarantee Worth in Land Markets? Evidence from Bengaluru, India" falls in this last group by looking at the premium generated not only by a solid/guaranteed claim but also adequate planning in urban settings.

Abstract:     

"Land reforms require urgent attention in emerging market economies, and there is a vast body of literature that deals with the economic impact land reforms, especially land titling (Acemoglu et al., 2001). India, like other developing economies, has a presumptive titling system which is notoriously inefficient: a law that is in the draft stages of consultation is the Draft Land Titling Bill, 2011, which seeks to replace presumptive titles with conclusive ones. However, there is no study that has looked at the cost of not having an appropriate titling system. In this study, I attempt to quantify the premium paid towards title by using a quasi-natural experiment on differential titles that is available in the Indian market, utilizing land prices in Bangalore, India. The differential title to land comes about as a result of State's activity in using eminent domain to acquire land parcels, conferring superior title on the parcels so acquired. A hedonic model is applied to a data set of 2263 observations of appraised land values to tease out the impact of guaranteed land title on land prices."

The paper finds that the land title premium represents, in this case, a 4.3% increase in price. While this increase might not be significant enough for a private owner, as the costs of securing rights may easily overcome any expected profits, it begins to become significant for larger private developers and governments. The author calculates that for Karnataka real estate alone the welfare loss (fancy word for the amount the % increase is not currently realized) is at least 430 million USD, while the cost to the state to deliver title guarantee is 6.6 million USD (although probably that budget would dramatically increase if it were to cover the whole state, I would imagine). A very large unrealized potential.

To note that, in the study, the solid title is produced through the use of eminent domain, wiping out potential competing claims through compensation and legal standing. A methodology that may be hard to scale up or replicate. Nevertheless, the study shows both the advantage of clear and uncontested land titles, and also the role of the state in providing a registration and guarantee service.

How Powerful is Rouhani in the Islamic Republic? - Research Paper

Iran's Nuclear talks have recently been extended, whether because Rouhani's engagement or the late rapprochement between USA and Iran due to Daesh/ISIL still remains to be seen. Bastani's "How Powerful is Rouhani in the Islamic Republic?" has a look at the power dynamics within the Iranian government around two key points: President Rouhani's standing vis a vis Supreme Leader Khamenei, and secondly the how the nuclear talks shape does dynamics.

This is an interesting paper that reminds us that while leadership is important, aligning interest groups (in a wider sense) and coalition building are fundamental for actual policy change.

Introduction

"One of the key questions being asked about the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme is how powerful President Hassan Rouhani really is within Iran’s unique political system. In other words, in a country where the key power-holder is the Supreme Leader, do Rouhani and his colleagues have the ability to advance their agenda and implement an international nuclear agreement despite their powerful opponents? This question is of particular importance because during the presidency of pro-reform Mohammad Khatami, Rouhani was in charge of the nuclear talks and reached an important arrangement with the international community, suspending uranium enrichment and opening nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections; a few years later, however, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was unhappy with the attitude of the Western powers towards Iran, halted the implementation of these arrangements.

With this historical perspective in mind, an examination of the balance of power in Iran under Rouhani’s presidency, and a review of the tools at his disposal and those in the hands of his powerful rivals, is critical. This paper examines Rouhani’s chief priorities in the domestic and foreign domains; analyses the factors that help, and those that impede, his administration in attaining its goals; and assesses the relationship between the president and Iran’s other institutions of power, including his influence on the country’s security apparatus. Finally, the effects of the possible success and failure of the Rouhani administration, particularly in respect of the nuclear dossier as its most important priority, will be examined.

It should be noted that the focus of this paper is on the power balance within the Iranian regime. An examination of the role of the elite and of the discontented masses in the overall picture would require a separate study"

Summary from the paper below the fold

The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development - Paper

Institutions have become the buzzword in development int the past decade, more and more books, articles and Noble Prices go to the field of study where culture and economics interact. Tamanaha's paper "The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development" wades into the debate by not only highlighting the different interpretations of 'institution' but also the limits that this new institutionalist drive encounters.

Abstract:     

"New Institutional Economics (NIE) has secured impressive achievements in academia and policy circles. The World Bank and other development organization in the past two decades have expended billions of dollars on efforts to build “good governance” and the “rule of law” informed by the NIE theory that economic development requires supportive political and legal institutions. NIE appears to be the new consensus view of development thinking, supplanting the neo-liberal Washington Consensus that dominated global development policy in the 1980s and 1990s. NIE scholars interested in development are currently engaged in an effort to map and measure the institutional terrain with the expressed purpose of producing policy advice on how to improve economic performance through institutional reform.

This essay elaborates on the barriers that stand in the way of the knowledge and policy goals of NIE. Foremost is the “interconnectedness of society:” cultural, technological, legal, political, and economic activities all affect one another and are affected by one another, often in ways that are subtle and all but invisible; each situation unique in its constellation of social forces and is dynamic, constantly changing in reaction to surrounding influences. To show why these aspects cannot be overcome by NIE scholars, I explore the ongoing struggle to identify a shared conception of “institution” — and I explain why this cannot be solved. For reasons I go on to elaborate, NIE scholars also will not be able to get a precise grip on the surrounding institutional influences that affect economic development. This incapacity shows up time and again in NIE research. The same barriers that stand in the way of knowledge also promise to stymie the policy ambitions of NIE scholars who seek to promote economic development. NIE scholars today, it turns out, are repeating lessons announced five decades ago in the law and development field. The problems were insuperable then and will remain so. Owing to these barriers, little advice can be offered beyond commonsense recommendations — pay attention to local circumstances, experiment to find out what works, don’t apply a “one size fits all” model. Interconnectedness, dynamism, and uniqueness are behind this advice. While critical of NIE knowledge and policy objectives, this essay is not negative in orientation. NIE research is illuminating. Greater awareness of the limits will help orient future work in the field in the most fruitful directions."

 

I am not so sure NIE has fully supplanted the Washington Consensus, but it is true that the language around development has shifted towards governance, institutions, rule of law and the like. Whether this represents a larger shift in global thinking remains to be seen, as many discussions around global economic social and political relations are still stuck in the old paradigm (i.e. austerity, organized crime, migration)... and these have as much impact (or more) on development than the development sector itself. While NIE does acknowledge the importance of informal institutions, the greater focus on formal/legal ones does a disservice to the discipline and undermines its utility for practitioners.

The author also points out something that anybody coming into economics from another academic area realizes really quick: economic tools are very, very abstract and inadequate to deal with actual social dynamics. While there is more interest in behavioral economics and other attempts to bridge that gap, there is always a nagging feeling that economists are reinventing the wheel and catching up with discussions that other subject had, at least, a couple of decades ago.

Overall the paper is a good primer on where New Institutional Economics is and the debate on what an institution is.

Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups - Paper

Thurber's "Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups" highlights the issue of labels and trying to fit everything into an specific world view does not actually help in understanding conflict dynamics, or state formation/legitimacy for that matter. This paper can be read together with the previously commented "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness"

Abstract

"The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence"

By labeling militias as warlords, paramilitaries or foreign proxies (or terrorist, if it fits the political agenda), we are simplifying the role that some of them play. While historically some militias have been part of statebuilding process, the view nowadays is that they are rather an indicator of state's weakness and lack of full sovereignty. As the author points out, militias with a strong sociopolitical foundation do have a representational/political role to play on behalf their communities. Instead of dealing with them just with military means, a wider approach that takes into account the community aspirations is much needed. Hence, sociopolitical militias life cycle is part of an ebb and flow of relations between the state and the community: when the state addresses community needs, then the militia weakens. However, if the state is weak, the militia gains importance as provider of security and social services. The paradox comes when the militia replaces the state, as they tend to over-reach (abuse of violence, fundamentalist policies, lack of adequate checks and balances) and increase the discontent among the community (breaking the internal coalition of support), therefore bringing another militia or the state back into play. From this perspective, militia's strengths and structure as an opposition group does not prepare it for a governing role.

I find interesting that the author's focus on the Shia seems to sideline the fact that a similar dynamics of Sunni sociopolitical militias might be growing in response to the Shia preponderance within the government and the role of Shia militias.

The paper also gives an interesting primer on Iraq Shia dynamics. I thought there were only two Sadrs, but if fact there are three. 

Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan - Paper

The term 'fragile state' has become common currency in development circles since 9/11, especially as seen through a security lens as shown by Barakat and Larson's  "Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan".  

Abstract

"Current conceptions and models of fragile statehood in conflict-affected contexts can serve the purposes of international donor governments over and above reconstruction and statebuilding. First, despite remaining ill-defined, the fragile state concept is widely utilized by donors to oversimplify analysis of complex political environments, such as that of Afghanistan, leading to inadequate bureaucratic responses. Second, current models of fragile statehood are unable to capture contextual or temporal dynamics, and invariably omit the contribution of international intervention to entrenching fragility. This is particularly the case in Afghanistan where the effects of international militarized stabilization responses have not been systematically included in fragility assessments, leading to increased insecurity. This article calls for a more nuanced approach to fragility and greater acknowledgement of the role donor governments can play in its entrenchment."

The underlying assumption of fragility in which weak central government = terrorism/regional contagion has meant that much of the focus has been centered on security responses. Moreover, the definition of fragility also assumes a definition of state (termed Weberian by the authors) that does not necessarily match the affected populations view. Fragility as a concept is very anchored in a nation-state system, in which it is both undermined (by acknowledging that the central government is not fully sovereign/legitimate) and reinforced (by making statebuilding around the central government).

Is the concept actually useful for anything? the label helps donors frame priorities by highlighting the sense of impending doom, crisis-prone, destabilizing the status quo and bringing a yet new haven for terrorist and criminals. However, from the 'recipient' point of view, this label is barely helpful (aside from bringing extra donor funds) as it tends to focus more on the container (the visible role of the state) rather than the content (the underlying political economy and cultural/social dynamics that may be the source of that weakness)

The authors, by using the case of Afghanistan, also put forth the claim that international assistance, by the way the understand and address this concept, are actually promoting fragility rather than diminishing. It is interesting how both donor and development community are promoting bottom-up (Community Driven Recovery) and top-down (Statebuilding) in parallel with a vague hope that they will meet at some point in the middle rather than acknowledging that fragile states are in that situation because of an ongoing multilevel societal crisis that may not fit the ready-made nation state model.

                 

Interesting links

Recent interesting articles:

- Mathematically defining Hipsters?

- How can Scandinavian countries tax so much? 

- Distance to the equator and economic development, explanation for the reversal of fortunes? 

- Compensating civilians during war, individual victims under International Law?

Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia?: Learning from the 2011 famine - Interim Paper

An interesting paper looking at the 2011 Somalia crisis, Maxwell and Majid's "Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia?: Learning from the 2011 famine" goes straight to the point. An easy read that serves also as a primer for humanitarian dynamics in the country.

Intro:
"In July 2014, humanitarian agencies and the government of Somalia warned of a new severe drought in Somalia, only three years after more than 250,000 people died in a deadly famine. In a report for Tufts University and the Rift Valley Institute, Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid examine the lessons arising from the international response to the famine in 2011 on how to prevent and mitigate a similar crisis."  

Key points from the paper:
- Early Warning was there despite some recent complains on the quality/reliability of the data. The failure points more to the humanitarian framework, that has a bias towards response rather than prevention/mitigation. How much is forecasting really integrated into planning and funding still remains to be seen, and as we have seen in previous papers, take up of forecasting is different by sector (El Nino oscillations) even if the potential positive preventive effects are quite high (Violence in Liberia). In some cases we do enter in a Chronic Early Warning that lead to an institutionalization of preparedness, mitigation and response (a humanitarian example is Haiti and the Hurricane Season), but I don't believe Somalia is there yet.
- Risk Management, Access... and of course Al-Shabaab. While Al-Shabaab's behavior (internal taxes and blocking of external aid) did exacerbate the crisis, the risk management mechanisms of international actors also limited the response. Reliance on local organizations of variable quality and allegiance coupled with limited direct implementation/monitoring capacity, has meant that many of the interventions were/are shaped by risk management rather that needs and effectiveness. 
- Us, us , us. Most of the discussions around the 2011 crisis are around the international response; yet, in a time were resilience is the buzzword of the day, very little attention is given to the Somali response and how it can be further strengthened. The paper also points out the reinforcement of marginalization for certain clans through the crisis (that further feeds into Somalia's instability by clan competition and Al-Shabaab comparative appeal).
 
Following Amartya Sen's thinking, we can say that famine is not a food failure but rather a political failure (in the wider sense of governance and allocation of resources).

Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls - Paper

'Hearts and Minds' is a much used term in counterinsurgency discussions, originating from a now famous sentence by Gerald Templar on the Malayan Emergency. The battle for local public opinion becoming as important, or more, as military operations. Cohen puts that assumption to the test in "Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls" by analyzing local perceptions during three conflicts: Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
 
Abstract

"Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought"

What the paper shows is that changes of perception actually follow and are not a precursor to effective military operations, even more, in some cases those changes in public opinion do lag behind in time even if important improvements in security have taken place (by objective indicators). While it has always been difficult to measure both psychological warfare and 'hearts and minds' approaches in times of conflict, the author's analysis does indicate the need, at least, of successful military operations/outcomes in order to turn public opinion. However, I do find the interpretation of 'hearts and minds' somewhat restrictive as it goes beyond the media/community engagement part of it and also includes how military operations are conducted (specially in relation to the community). Also the criticism against the concept of 'uncommitted third' (the section of the population sitting on the fence between two contenders) feels more of nitpicking (should it be the 'uncommitted fourth' or 'fifth'?) rather than actually making the case against it. The fact (even as per the polling analyzed by the author) that there is a section of the population that over time changes alignments and allegiances (whether previously committed or not) has been shown in each human conflict. The 'uncommitted third' concept at the end of the day is a simplification of the acceptance that there is a dynamic environment and competition for the space.

'Hearts and Minds' strategist may have fallen into their own rhetoric by allowing their perceptions shape reality. Maybe they have become a case of successful 'hearts and minds', where the behavior is changed by the mind rather than force. In my opinion, this doesn't undermine 'hearts and minds' as a concept but rather show the difficulty of a full understanding and implementation. Finding the balance between the coercing and convincing is not easy, and, as the study shows, maybe there has to be some coercing before the convincing works.

Inheritance Law Reform, Empowerment, and Human Capital Accumulation: Second-Generation Effects from India - Working Paper

Policy effects across generations are sometimes difficult to measure, however "Inheritance Law Reform, Empowerment, and Human Capital Accumulation: Second-Generation Effects from India" by Deininger et al. does offer an interesting example.

Abstract:     

"This paper uses evidence from three Indian states, one of which amended inheritance legislation in 1994, to assess first- and second-generation effects of inheritance reform using a triple-difference strategy. Second-generation effects on education, time use, and health are larger and more significant than first-generation effects even controlling for mothers' endowments. Improved access to bank accounts and sanitation as well as lower fertility in the parent generation suggest that inheritance reform empowered females in a sustainable way, a notion supported by significantly higher female survival rates."

Inheritance Law is inter-generational by definition (unless it has a strong bias towards widows, but then it becomes a question of patience). India, with its different speed of adoption of the law, allows for a interesting natural experiment, that the authors take a step further by measuring impact on second generation. The study finds large effects on multiple variables, probably due to an increased intra-household bargaining power by women (first generation) that benefit their offspring (second generation). While there are potential indicators for sexual selection (the cost of a female born increases), the survival rates and welfare effects on daughters are noticeable.

The fact that second generation effects are not only measurable but also large, should lead to a rethink on how to time and expect results from such policies. This further adds to the female empowerment literature, the potential for sustained change through policy reform and its welfare related effects.

Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan - Article

Us, development types, rarely look at the military's experience in stabilization and counterinsurgency (COIN). It is unfortunate because many of the dynamics and constrains they face are not that dissimilar from our work in Community Driven Recovery and local peacebuilding. Briggs' article "Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan" is a case in point where cross-learning may be of use.

Abstract

"This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success"

Key take-away notes.

Know your context: Tribal governance, relations with both insurgents and central government, and conflicts within the district are key to understand what is going on.

Population? which population?: COIN claims that is population centric, and that is fair enough. However, as the article points out, the center of gravity regarding insurgency in the district was actually not at the district center. We tend to focus on visible sources of 'power' like concentration of houses, markets or official buildings around which we build our activities... and while this locations may serve multiple purposes for the community, it may not be as relevant for the issue at hand (be that counterinsurgency or building a water well). Also depending on how we define population (and their representatives) we run the risk of mis-identifying or ignoring key stakeholders.

Local Economy: While local sourcing seems like a great idea, in practice it can lead to inflation and higher costs for local population (let alone dependence). How external resources are injected into a local economy is very important.

Governance: There are already governance mechanisms in place, however many of the linkages are broken and are a source of mistrust and conflict. Reestablishing those links, specially around dispute/grievance resolution, dialogue and information flow is paramount.

While this article per se is not telling us much new (if I were to venture a guess, the major outcome of this is bonus points for the author for publishing), even from the military point of view (how relevant is Naval Special Warfare to the article, I still don't know); it also highlights common issues that we encounter in conflict or post-conflict areas. This requires us to design and implement with very context-based lens (that allegedly we already do!!). 

The article also shows that the military, like the development business, keeps reinventing the wheel time after time... but that is whole different debate regarding organizational learning, mission setting and leadership.

 

 

Getting teachers back to the classroom. A systematic review on what works to improve teacher attendance in developing countries - Paper

Education remains one of key pillars of development, and indicators like literacy rate and school attendance are regularly used as a measure. "Getting teachers back to the classroom. A systematic review on what works to improve teacher attendance in developing countries" by Guerrero et al, looks more specifically at one component of education: teacher attendance.

Abstract

"This article reports on a systematic review of research on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at increasing teacher attendance in developing countries. After a comprehensive search process, nine studies met the inclusion criteria. Pooled effects sizes of included studies were estimated (with the exception of three studies that had unavailable information to calculate their effect sizes). Results show that direct interventions coupling monitoring systems with incentives and indirect interventions involving the community and parents in students’ education had statistically significant effects on teacher attendance, suggesting that close monitoring and attractive incentives are mechanisms of high potential to reduce teacher absenteeism".

To note that this paper looks at a very limited set of studies (9), as it only reviews rigorous impact evaluations within their parameters. The findings themselves are not groundbreaking and fairly intuitive: both direct and indirect interventions have a positive effect. Those that already following educational issues will not be surprised, but it may be useful as a quick overview on teacher attendance for newcomers.

Probably the most interesting fact is that they could not link teacher attendance and student achievement (although the study was not specifically looking at that). While school may have other social benefits (i.e. socialization, keeping youth contained), the main stated objective is educational outcome. However, increased teacher attendance does not necessarily lead to improved educational outcomes. Probably the leading advocate these days on this issue is Lant Pritchett, but also others have highlighted time and again the disconnect between educational inputs (focus on teachers,  buildings, materials) and actual educational outcomes.