Interesting Links

Interesting links this week:

- Pad Thai and state building (of Thailand that is).

- Self-government among pirates, prisoners and preliterates, (self)rule of law anyone? Peter Leeson is already known for his work on pirates, interesting how it spreads into other groups.

- A collection of papers on conflict and fragility in Africa from the World Bank blog

- Global Witness report on jade extraction in Myanmar

Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade - Job Market Paper

Industrial policy is always a contentious argument in development economics between free-marketers and state intervention. Réka Juhász's Job Market Paper "TemporaryProtection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade" brings historical evidence to that debate through an interesting natural experiment from the early 19th century.

Abstract

"This paper uses a natural experiment to assess whether temporary protection from trade with industrial leaders can foster development of infant industries in follower countries. Using a new dataset compiled from primary sources, I find that in the short-run regions (départements) in the French Empire which became better protected from trade with the British for exogenous reasons during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) increased capacity in a new technology, mechanised cotton spinning, to a larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. Temporary protection had long term effects. In particular, by exploiting the fact that the post-war location of the cotton industry was determined to a large extent by the historical accident of the wars, I first show that the location of cotton spinning within France was persistent, and firms located in regions with higher post-war spinning capacity were more productive 30 years later. Second, I find that after the restoration of peace, exports of cotton goods from France increased substantially, consistent with evolving comparative advantage in cottons. Third, I show that as late as 1850, France and Belgium - both part of the French Empire prior to 1815 - had larger cotton spinning industries than other Continental European countries which were not protected from British trade during the wars; this suggests that adoption of the new technology was far from inevitable."

Interestingly, the paper studies the effects of an event and policy that was not designed for industrial purposes: the Napoleonic Wars and the Continental Blockade. While the Continental Blockade had the foreign policy purpose of undermining Britain's trade advantage/power and not necessarily a protectionist measure for French industry (in this case cotton). Probably the most interesting case may be that of Belgium and not that of France. During the Napoleonic Wars, Belgium was under French control (1794-1815) until it became part of the Netherlands. However, cotton industry grew more in Belgium than in the Netherlands in the post-Napoleonic period.. pointing out to the second issue: Technology Adoption

The results show there may be some role to be played for protectionist policies for infant industries not only to establish productive capacity but also the be able to adopt/adapt new technologies more successfully. On the other hand, the temporary protection was not sector-specific but across the board, leading to the interpretation that industrial policy may be more effective by focusing on the general environment rather than specific industries, allowing for an efficient internal reallocation of resources.

To note that the study focuses on a successful case and does not look at the industries that may have been wiped out after the lifting of the blockade, so we should be careful in making general economic welfare interpretations at country level.

Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan - Paper

The term 'fragile state' has become common currency in development circles since 9/11, especially as seen through a security lens as shown by Barakat and Larson's  "Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan".  

Abstract

"Current conceptions and models of fragile statehood in conflict-affected contexts can serve the purposes of international donor governments over and above reconstruction and statebuilding. First, despite remaining ill-defined, the fragile state concept is widely utilized by donors to oversimplify analysis of complex political environments, such as that of Afghanistan, leading to inadequate bureaucratic responses. Second, current models of fragile statehood are unable to capture contextual or temporal dynamics, and invariably omit the contribution of international intervention to entrenching fragility. This is particularly the case in Afghanistan where the effects of international militarized stabilization responses have not been systematically included in fragility assessments, leading to increased insecurity. This article calls for a more nuanced approach to fragility and greater acknowledgement of the role donor governments can play in its entrenchment."

The underlying assumption of fragility in which weak central government = terrorism/regional contagion has meant that much of the focus has been centered on security responses. Moreover, the definition of fragility also assumes a definition of state (termed Weberian by the authors) that does not necessarily match the affected populations view. Fragility as a concept is very anchored in a nation-state system, in which it is both undermined (by acknowledging that the central government is not fully sovereign/legitimate) and reinforced (by making statebuilding around the central government).

Is the concept actually useful for anything? the label helps donors frame priorities by highlighting the sense of impending doom, crisis-prone, destabilizing the status quo and bringing a yet new haven for terrorist and criminals. However, from the 'recipient' point of view, this label is barely helpful (aside from bringing extra donor funds) as it tends to focus more on the container (the visible role of the state) rather than the content (the underlying political economy and cultural/social dynamics that may be the source of that weakness)

The authors, by using the case of Afghanistan, also put forth the claim that international assistance, by the way the understand and address this concept, are actually promoting fragility rather than diminishing. It is interesting how both donor and development community are promoting bottom-up (Community Driven Recovery) and top-down (Statebuilding) in parallel with a vague hope that they will meet at some point in the middle rather than acknowledging that fragile states are in that situation because of an ongoing multilevel societal crisis that may not fit the ready-made nation state model.

                 

For Better and Worse: Border Fixity, State Capacity, and the Geography of War - Working Paper

Multiple studies have shown that war has been in decline, however, as Atzili and Young show in their paper "For Better and Worse: Border Fixity, State Capacity, and the Geography of War" , there is also a spatial component to conflict that should be taken into account.

Abstract:     

"Recent scholarship suggests interstate war is on the decline. In fact, some scholars claim that war is nearly obsolete. But is this decline universal? Using newly coded data, we show that the general decline in the phenomenon of interstate war is not evenly distributed across regions of the world. We argue that this geographic shift of warfare is impacted by the interaction of the international norm of border fixity, a proscription of the forceful conquest and annexation of homeland territory, and state capacity. We examine current scholarship on the issue and explore cases that demonstrate several mechanisms that link our explanation to the shifting geography of war."

 

The link between war and state capacity is quite intuitive, just from a game theory or risk management perspective, conflict with a stronger state should be avoided.. on the other hand the stronger party has the 'incentive' to go to war. This paper analyzes a second variable: border fixity, the international norm that makes current state boundaries (a legacy of post-WW2 world) fix. The age-old mechanism of conquest and annexation as a method of replacing weaker states by stronger ones is not accepted anymore.

The relationship between state capacity, border fixity and war is an interesting one and further reinforced by their spatial analysis of war. While war has been in the decline in Europe and the American continent (the geography of war is defined by the location where conflict takes place not by their participants), it has been on the rise in Asia and Africa.

What role does border fixity play? According to the authors, it provides a level of security to the states, the knowledge that their territorial integrity will not be put into question. This becomes a positive reinforcement among states with strong capacity, as it enables them to focus on other things and establish a new level of trust. However, where state capacity is weak, the dynamic reverses and regime change/interventions/support to rebel groups become common instruments.

Interestingly, the biggest (normative) challenger to border fixity these days are not state competing claims over territories (that nevertheless remain worrisome and potential triggers), but secessionist movements. A threat from within for which there is not really an adequate mechanism under international relations.

Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms - Kenya Working Paper

As practitioners of development and peacebuilding, we usually develop a rule of thumb: "ethnic divisions as a predictor of ...." conflict, lack of trust, implementation inefficiencies, mis-allocation of resources, corruption, [put your own experience/pet theory here]. On the other hand we tend to be very aspirational/principled about diversity and how everybody should be included. Hjort's paper "Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms",in a way, addresses this issue from a business management/productivity in Kenya standpoint.

Abstract

"A body of literature suggests that ethnic heterogeneity limits economic growth. This paper

provides microeconometric evidence on the direct effect of ethnic divisions on productivity. In team production at a plant in Kenya, an upstream worker supplies and distributes flowers to two downstream workers who assemble them into bunches. The plant uses an essentially random rotation process to assign workers to positions, leading to three types of teams: (a) ethnically homogeneous teams, and teams in which (b) one or (c) both downstream workers belong to a tribe in rivalry with the upstream worker's tribe. I find strong evidence that upstream workers undersupply non-coethnic downstream workers (vertical discrimination) and shift flowers from non-coethnic to coethnic downstream workers (horizontal discrimination), at the cost of lower own pay and total output. A period of ethnic conflict following Kenya's 2007 election led to a sharp increase in discrimination. In response, the plant began paying the two downstream workers for their combined output (team pay). This led to a modest output reduction in (a) and (c) teams (as predicted by standard incentive models) but an increase in output in (b) teams, and overall. Workers' behavior before conflict, during conflict, and under team pay is predicted by a model of taste-based discrimination. My findings suggest that inter-ethnic rivalries lower allocative efficiency in the private sector, that the economic costs of ethnic diversity vary with the political environment, and that in high-cost environments firms are forced to adopt "second best" policies to limit discrimination distortions."

Overall, ethnic divisions do reduce productivity both before and during active conflict through discrimination (as measured by output, not by perceptions or declared attitudes). Team design/task allocation does have a impact on the level of decreased productivity in comparison with a fully homogeneous team. Active conflict (in this case the 2007-08 election violence in Kenya) increases the discrimination (although we could have guessed that) but also the discrimination continues afterwards (a certain level of persistence). The firm's "solution" is to switch from individual productivity pay to group pay, a "second-best" option in terms of productivity in comparison to full segregation; but probably a good idea in terms of context, perception and business sustainability.

Implications for our work? Principled diversity without a good institutional design can have very inefficient outcomes (as we have seen, power sharing can be also a predictor of violence). In cases where we are working with divided ethnicities, special attention is required on the incentives to discriminate or not (i.e. group gains vs individual, payment on results rather than functions, etc..). This not only applies to the 'beneficiaries', but may also need to have a hard look inside our own operations and teams; as we tend to operate with HR manuals and processes that have a high personal responsibility component (in the study, the shop managers were not even aware of the extent of productivity differences!)

The author is careful to note that ethnic division, in this case, is a political construct, where an Bantu group (Luhya) alligns with a Nilotic group (Luo), in opposition to another Bantu group (Kikuyu).

HT to Chris Blattman

Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Civil War Violence? - Afghanistan Working Paper

Another forecasting working paper, this time on Afghanistan :"Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Civil War Violence?" by Hirose, Imai and Lyall. This paper also looks at counter-counterinsurgency (if that word exists), what is, probably, an understudied phenomenon but key in protracted conflicts where each contender keeps learning and adapting to each other strategies.

 Abstract:     

"Are civilian attitudes a useful predictor of patterns of violence in civil wars? A prominent debate has emerged among scholars and practitioners about the importance of winning civilian "hearts and minds" for influencing their wartime behavior. We argue that such efforts may have a dark side: insurgents can use pro-counterinsurgent attitudes as cues to select their targets and tactics. We conduct an original survey experiment in 204 Afghan villages to establish a positive association between pro-International Security Assistance Force attitudes and future Taliban attacks. We then extend analysis to 14,606 non-surveyed villages to demonstrate that our measure of civilian attitudes improves out-of-sample predictive performance by 20-30% over a standard forecasting model. The results are especially strong for Taliban attacks with improvised explosive devices. These improvements in predictive power remain even after accounting for possible confounders, including past violence, military bases, and economic assistance."

The overall finding may be intuitively easy to accept: insurgents and counterinsurgents are trying to gain control over an area, therefore a successful "heart and minds" will trigger a response. However, the study highlights not only the dynamic nature of targeting but also of tactics and how exposure of risk varies (from targeted to indiscriminate attacks).While a single study a theory might not make, it is clear that insurgency targeting and decision making processes need further analysis and understanding.

  

The findings of the study do have many policy and programming consequences:

In many cases our risk matrix identifies things that could go wrong but rarely the risk of success and how to mitigate it (not the success but the risk). Do No Harm approaches do have some understanding of this but usually as a preventative measure (insurgents may prevent us implementation) and not necessarily as a result.

The forecasting power of the model is also quite interesting. Again, not only for counter-insurgency actors but also for development actors. If we can forecast the use of specific tactics as per changes in attitudes, implementation tools and modalities can vary over time to adapt to the changing risk. I.e. triggering Mine Risk Education activities (focused on IEDs) or switching to small group/household level meetings (to avoid large gatherings) in locations when an attitude indicator reaches certain level. Early Warning systems can also benefit from this model.

On the issue of transferability, I think the concept/methodology does lend itself to be used in other contexts, but of course the need for adapting it to the local insurgency tactics (not all insurgencies may respond the same way to successful hearts and minds due to operational, political or social constrains). It is also important to accept the adaptive nature of tactics and that they don't remain fix in time. Tactics evolve over time, sometimes as a response, sometimes due to technology/knowledge transfer; therefore both the programming and the forecasting teams will need to revise and analyze the model and results regularly.

Finally, development and security need to go together in the cases where development can be understood as undermining insurgencies' hold on a contested location. Many (most) NGOs make the claim of neutrality and also assume that working directly with beneficiaries or local 'communities' is also neutral. However, this may not be the way they are perceived by either local population and insurgents (and counterinsurgents for that matter). Ignorance on how our operations may alter local power dynamics not only puts our staff at risk, but also the wider population, as the study shows.

Predicción de violencias locales en Liberia [Spanish Version]

[Spanish version of previous post/ Versión española de articulo en inglés]

Es interesante que apenas utilicemos modelos de predicción cuando programamos en prevención de conflictos en ámbito comunitario. La mayoría de las veces o bien utilizamos un conjunto de supuestos básicos o tomamos conflictos pasados ​​como indicadores de los futuros (que, la verdad, tiende a ser un indicador bastante fiable). Un paso alentador es el nuevo estudio de Blair, Blattman y Hartman: Predicción de violencias locales en Liberia [en inglés]. A continuación está el sumario:

"Utilizamos los modelos de pronóstico y nuevos datos de 242 comunidades de Liberia para demostrar que es posible predecir los brotes de violencia local con alta sensibilidad y precisión moderada, incluso con datos limitados. Capacitamos a nuestros modelos para predecir la violencia comunitaria y penal en 2010 utilizando factores de riesgo medidos en 2008 comparamos las predicciones a la violencia actual en 2012 y encontramos que hasta un 88% de toda la violencia se predijo correctamente. Verdaderos positivos vienen a costa de muchos falsos positivos, dando precisión global entre el 33% y el 50%. Desde una perspectiva política, los estados, las organizaciones internacionales y las fuerzas de paz podrían utilizar este tipo de predicciones para prevenir y responder mejor a la violencia. Los modelos también generan nuevos datos estilizados que la teoría necesita explicar. En este caso, los predictores más fuertes de más violencia son divisiones sociales (principalmente étnicas), y coaliciones con grupos minoritarios" [Original en inglés, Google Translate con correcciones]

Los puntos principales, en mi opinión, son los siguientes:

- Han identificado como relevantes un número limitado de indicadores clave. Esto puede significar que incluso pequeños programas/organizaciones serian capaces de reunir los datos necesarios. Puede que los resultados sean específicos de Liberia, o incluso a las regiones bajo estudio (la pregunta habitual de: ¿Es transferible a otros contextos?), pero la metodología parece prometedora.

- ¿! Qué pasa con el reparto del poder?!?! Es posible que tengamos que investigar más en detalle sobre la "calidad" de coaliciones y acuerdos, y en qué manera afectan las dinámicas de poder. ¿Elevan las expectativas de los grupos minoritarios y dan lugar a más conflictos? o ¿los grupos mayoritarios no terminan de aceptar la presencia de los grupos minoritarios? ¡Tal vez deberíamos enfocar el problema desde la teoría de juegos! 

- ¿Son más precisos nuestros poderes de predicción (intuición) que el modelo a la hora de seleccionar los lugares de trabajo en las etapas de diseño e implementación? Las herramientas de predicción puede ser especialmente útiles cuando hay nuevo personal con conocimientos conceptuales o contextuales limitados (facilitando así el proceso inicial de aprendizaje) y en el proceso de diseño

- La idea de que el modelo auto-aprenda o sea capaz de generar nuevos indicadores o datos. Esto puede ayudar en la identificación de nuevas tendencias (no teorizadas) a lo largo del tiempo. En cierto modo esto está conectado con el hecho de que data-mining parece tener una mala imagen y, sin embargo, se las arregla de vez en cuando para sorprendernos y plantear nuevas preguntas.

- Y, por supuesto, la pregunta que está viene de mi lado practico/terreno: ¿cómo puedo utilizar la previsión como base de referencia para la medición del impacto en la prevención de conflictos? Aparte de la cuestión de atribución, aceptaran los donantes los conflictos inexistentes (¿prevenidos?) pero que fueron pronosticados anteriormente? ¿Van a aceptar realmente la previsión como herramienta de planificación? Como hemos visto en Somalia, en el caso de la sequía y la seguridad alimentaria, las atenciones se agudizan en las primeras etapas de las crisis pero no cuando se pronosticó o incluso el inicio mismo.

The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa (Crisis Group Report)

While the speed of events are out-dating some components of the International Crisis Group report (from June 2014), it nevertheless serve as a good primer for understanding current dynamics in Yemen. Maybe further analysis on how AQAP may atract Salafi and Islah supporters in their fight with the Houthi, and also the Southern Movement positioning after the Houthi take over of the capital, would be required in the next report (that at this rate it will probably be soon)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
"The power balance in Yemen’s north is shifting. In early 2014, Zaydi Shiite fighters, known as the Huthis or Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), won a series of battles, in effect consolidating their control over Saada governorate, on the border of Saudi Arabia, and expanding southward to the gates of the capital, Sanaa. Now a patchwork of shaky ceasefires is in place, albeit battered by bouts of violence. Tensions are high between Huthis and their various opponents – the Ahmar family, Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (no relation to the Ahmar family) and his military allies, Salafi fighters, and the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, and their affiliated tribes. Fear is growing that an escalation could draw the state into a prolonged conflict. To head off a conflagration, the parties must turn the inchoate understandings reached during the country’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC) into an implementable peace plan. 

Renewed violence comes at a sensitive time in the country’s transition. In January 2014, Yemenis completed the NDC, which produced a blueprint for far-reaching political reforms. But the plan is aspirational at best. The country has until January 2015 to complete drafting a constitution and a referendum approving it, before holding parliamentary and presidential elections later in the year. Obstacles are many, including a weak, divided government; a desperate economic situation; and deteriorated security. Widespread violence would imperil the transition by undermining the state’s already weak authority and its embryonic political consensus. The status quo is already doing so, albeit more slowly. 
(More below the jump)

The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food - Book Review

"The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food" by Lizzie Collingham is a excellent book on a quite neglected topic: food policy during World War 2, its underlying philosophy and its consequences.

There are plenty of references in books and movies to food during the war: from the diminishing rice in a civilian internment camp in China (J. G. Ballard's biographical "Empire of the Sun" and its corresponding movie by Spielberg), the chocolate of US paratroopers in "Band of Brothers", the hunger of the Leningrad siege, kids waiting for the scraps in "The Big Red One" to Japanese soldiers desperately scavenging for food in Powell's "The Soldier". There is even quite cited research on the effects of the Dutch Hongerwinter famine of 1944. And yet food supply and strategies are rarely explicitly described, even though they had an immense impact (between 19 and 25 million dead due to famine)

This book is extremely well researched, presenting the policies, context and actions of the contenders. Germany's lesson from WWI (autarky and lebensraum) that lead to 'efficient' rationing, management of the occupied territories, the Hunger Plan, genocide and the "useless eaters". Japan's early forays into scientific military nutrition, and yet an under-supplied army, expansionist policies, food shortages in the homeland and abroad (specially China and Chinese PoWs but also elsewhere in the "Sphere of Co-Prosperity"), and the devastating effects of the US blockade. Britain's egalitarian approach to rationing, the mobilization of the Commonwealth (and the Bengal Famine) and the key Battle of the Atlantic to keep the food supply open. United State's abundance and the stark difference between their troop's welfare and that of its allies. The Soviet perseverance in hunger conditions. All this had not only an effect on how the war was conducted and number of casualties, but also far reaching consequences in the shaping of post-war societies.

 Lots of interesting titbits, fascinating all around, and bringing a wider perspective of WW2 beyond battles and politics. Even if you are not interested in war-related topics, this political economy (kinda) perspective will certainly be informative and eye opening. The writing is good and flows well, although the way it is organized can sometimes be confusing. Recommended!!

"I want to become Caliph instead of the Caliph"

It seems that Iznogoud (with his famous catchphrase "I want to become Caliph instead of the Caliph") is getting pretty tough competition these days! First it was ISIL/IS/ISIS/Daesh, then Boko Haram and finally (or rather more recently) a refutation from 126 scholars and clerics.
Now I know why my middle-eastern friends would get so worked up when I would mention the Cordoba Caliphate! Well, I am not so sure myself that Abd-ar-Rahman was really the only Umayyad left after the Abbasid killing spree, but that is for others to debate. It seems that, like in Highlander, "there can only be one"!! A Caliphate represents a sovereign state of the Ummah (the entire Muslim community), and given that unity of the faithful is paramount (this could also be a reason my friends were dismissing the Cordoba Caliphate, it was competing directly with the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo and indirectly with the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad) a single leader and entity are required; a bit like the Pope and anti-Pope(s) of Catholic tradition.
One of the key arguments, based on Islamic jurisprudence (Sunni interpretation), against ISIL Caliphate is that it requires general consensus... and so far pretty much of the consensus is against. Maybe good old Al-Baghdadi would have been better off claiming a Shia Caliphate/Imamate where the majority is not necessary as it is divinely chosen (if the genealogy not checked too closely). But I think that bridge is well burnt by now.
Nevertheless, this Caliphate claims are more a political statement with religious connotations rather than the reverse.