Interesting Links

Interesting articles and links:

- Running surveys in warzones

- Does money buy Hearts and Minds? Mostly research in the Philippines but also elsewhere.

- Understanding the Civil Law, an interesting primer for people without legal background (and some interest in history)

Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups - Paper

Thurber's "Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups" highlights the issue of labels and trying to fit everything into an specific world view does not actually help in understanding conflict dynamics, or state formation/legitimacy for that matter. This paper can be read together with the previously commented "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness"

Abstract

"The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence"

By labeling militias as warlords, paramilitaries or foreign proxies (or terrorist, if it fits the political agenda), we are simplifying the role that some of them play. While historically some militias have been part of statebuilding process, the view nowadays is that they are rather an indicator of state's weakness and lack of full sovereignty. As the author points out, militias with a strong sociopolitical foundation do have a representational/political role to play on behalf their communities. Instead of dealing with them just with military means, a wider approach that takes into account the community aspirations is much needed. Hence, sociopolitical militias life cycle is part of an ebb and flow of relations between the state and the community: when the state addresses community needs, then the militia weakens. However, if the state is weak, the militia gains importance as provider of security and social services. The paradox comes when the militia replaces the state, as they tend to over-reach (abuse of violence, fundamentalist policies, lack of adequate checks and balances) and increase the discontent among the community (breaking the internal coalition of support), therefore bringing another militia or the state back into play. From this perspective, militia's strengths and structure as an opposition group does not prepare it for a governing role.

I find interesting that the author's focus on the Shia seems to sideline the fact that a similar dynamics of Sunni sociopolitical militias might be growing in response to the Shia preponderance within the government and the role of Shia militias.

The paper also gives an interesting primer on Iraq Shia dynamics. I thought there were only two Sadrs, but if fact there are three. 

Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls - Paper

'Hearts and Minds' is a much used term in counterinsurgency discussions, originating from a now famous sentence by Gerald Templar on the Malayan Emergency. The battle for local public opinion becoming as important, or more, as military operations. Cohen puts that assumption to the test in "Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls" by analyzing local perceptions during three conflicts: Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
 
Abstract

"Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought"

What the paper shows is that changes of perception actually follow and are not a precursor to effective military operations, even more, in some cases those changes in public opinion do lag behind in time even if important improvements in security have taken place (by objective indicators). While it has always been difficult to measure both psychological warfare and 'hearts and minds' approaches in times of conflict, the author's analysis does indicate the need, at least, of successful military operations/outcomes in order to turn public opinion. However, I do find the interpretation of 'hearts and minds' somewhat restrictive as it goes beyond the media/community engagement part of it and also includes how military operations are conducted (specially in relation to the community). Also the criticism against the concept of 'uncommitted third' (the section of the population sitting on the fence between two contenders) feels more of nitpicking (should it be the 'uncommitted fourth' or 'fifth'?) rather than actually making the case against it. The fact (even as per the polling analyzed by the author) that there is a section of the population that over time changes alignments and allegiances (whether previously committed or not) has been shown in each human conflict. The 'uncommitted third' concept at the end of the day is a simplification of the acceptance that there is a dynamic environment and competition for the space.

'Hearts and Minds' strategist may have fallen into their own rhetoric by allowing their perceptions shape reality. Maybe they have become a case of successful 'hearts and minds', where the behavior is changed by the mind rather than force. In my opinion, this doesn't undermine 'hearts and minds' as a concept but rather show the difficulty of a full understanding and implementation. Finding the balance between the coercing and convincing is not easy, and, as the study shows, maybe there has to be some coercing before the convincing works.

Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan - Article

Us, development types, rarely look at the military's experience in stabilization and counterinsurgency (COIN). It is unfortunate because many of the dynamics and constrains they face are not that dissimilar from our work in Community Driven Recovery and local peacebuilding. Briggs' article "Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan" is a case in point where cross-learning may be of use.

Abstract

"This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success"

Key take-away notes.

Know your context: Tribal governance, relations with both insurgents and central government, and conflicts within the district are key to understand what is going on.

Population? which population?: COIN claims that is population centric, and that is fair enough. However, as the article points out, the center of gravity regarding insurgency in the district was actually not at the district center. We tend to focus on visible sources of 'power' like concentration of houses, markets or official buildings around which we build our activities... and while this locations may serve multiple purposes for the community, it may not be as relevant for the issue at hand (be that counterinsurgency or building a water well). Also depending on how we define population (and their representatives) we run the risk of mis-identifying or ignoring key stakeholders.

Local Economy: While local sourcing seems like a great idea, in practice it can lead to inflation and higher costs for local population (let alone dependence). How external resources are injected into a local economy is very important.

Governance: There are already governance mechanisms in place, however many of the linkages are broken and are a source of mistrust and conflict. Reestablishing those links, specially around dispute/grievance resolution, dialogue and information flow is paramount.

While this article per se is not telling us much new (if I were to venture a guess, the major outcome of this is bonus points for the author for publishing), even from the military point of view (how relevant is Naval Special Warfare to the article, I still don't know); it also highlights common issues that we encounter in conflict or post-conflict areas. This requires us to design and implement with very context-based lens (that allegedly we already do!!). 

The article also shows that the military, like the development business, keeps reinventing the wheel time after time... but that is whole different debate regarding organizational learning, mission setting and leadership.

 

 

How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation - Paper

Although both ISIL and Boko Haram have recently taken the spotlight, the Al Qaeda franchise remains a recognizable actor. Hellmich's paper "How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation" looks into Ben Laden's ideology and how it fits into the wider contemporary Islamic discourse.

Abstract

"This article investigates the contested ideology of al-Qaeda through an analysis of Osama bin Ladin’s writings and public statements issued between 1994 and 2011, set in relation to the development of Islamic thought and changing socio-political realities in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Challenging popular conceptions of Wahhabism and the “Salafi jihad”, it reveals an idealistic, Pan-Islamic sentiment at the core of his messages that is not based on the main schools of Islamic theology, but is the result of a crisis of meaning of Islam in the modern world. Both before and after the death of al-Qaeda’s iconic leader, the continuing process of religious, political and intellectual fragmentation of the Muslim world has led to bin Ladin’s vision for unity being replaced by local factions and individuals pursuing their own agendas in the name of al-Qaeda and Islam."

The demise of the Ottoman Empire (and the sense of unity it carried), secularism/modernization and the expansion of literacy have opened up the Muslim world to an internal crisis/revolution. As individual Muslims increasingly interpret Islam for themselves, without making reference to the traditional schools of Sunni law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii or Hanbali) a divergence within develops. Pan-Islamism, with its core message of Muslim solidarity and the unity of umma, is the message that Ben Laden would send over the world. The appeal he represented was not a radical political/religious ideology (the actual political structure of the future is quite vague) but a social message of solidarity, personal responsibility and victimhood that many Muslims could relate to.

Even before Ben Laden's death, we could see the fragmentation of Al Qaeda along more locally driven agendas under the banner of global action.The fact that most of the victims of Al Qaeda are actually Muslims, the increase fighting along sectarian lines and the more limited objectives of affiliates and franchises show the drift away from Pan-Islamism. Although the rhetoric remains important in order to appeal for funds, foreign fighters and support from the Muslim community, what remains, to paraphrase the known sentence about politics, is that 'all insurgencies are local'. While Al Qaeda's position in the global ranking has diminished, some of the root causes for its appeal are still current and part of the ongoing debate within the Muslim world.

Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia - Paper

Plenty of ink has been spilled about Al-Shabab and the Somali context (not that we notice much difference most of the time); Botha and Abdile's "Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia" look at one key organizational development component: Recruitment. Summary below.

"Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab’s rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government, countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab."

The study doesn't really offer a novel insight into Al-Shabab's recruitment, it is a much needed reminder that many core issues that fuel radicalization are still ongoing. 88 former fighters were interviewed (plus 7 off-the-record), therefore it remains to be seen if the fact that they are not fighting anymore may give us a biased sample. Nevertheless it is a valuable attempt. However, I would have preferred to include a "control" sample of Somalis that did not join Al-Shabab, this way we can compare if the reasons for joining are unique for this group or shared across Somalia: i.e. if economic reasons are given for joining (it is the leading reason), then how different are the people that joined to those that didn't (probably not much) and therefore how relevant it may be as a reason.

The study highlights the usual suspects and some interesting points:
- economic incentives as positions within Al-Shabab are remunerated (crime does pay), and many of them would see it as a career path.
- propaganda, specially the perception that Islam is under threat mixed with nationalism (Christians invading the country)
- Status/empowerment, specially for marginalized youth and minority clans. Al-Shabab represents respect. It is also able to provide a sense of belonging and a common purpose (that affects retention of recruits, although the money did help)
- Fear and anger as driving emotions for recruitment 
- Peer networks are the source of contact and not family networks. Many would join through a friend and rarely through a family member. Interesting point in a society where family/clan are so important, and maybe the breakdown of that relationship is a leading driver
- There remains a high trust on elders, even though much of Al-Shabab rhetoric and actions tend to undermine that structure. On the other hand they see government as self-interested and illegitimate, being revolt a necessary step.
- Regret (or lack of). Many of the former fighters regretted being caught, and not necessarily joining Al-Shabab (probably linked to the sense of belonging that the organization is able to impress)
- Intelligence. The ability of Al-Shabab to collect intelligence (and act upon it, orchestrating complex operations) has been recognized for a while. That ability is not only an operational asset but it probably also reinforces their capacity to identify and recruit individuals.

The recommendations of the study are pretty much standard (and oft repeated), and yet again barely followed.

Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Civil War Violence? - Afghanistan Working Paper

Another forecasting working paper, this time on Afghanistan :"Can Civilian Attitudes Predict Civil War Violence?" by Hirose, Imai and Lyall. This paper also looks at counter-counterinsurgency (if that word exists), what is, probably, an understudied phenomenon but key in protracted conflicts where each contender keeps learning and adapting to each other strategies.

 Abstract:     

"Are civilian attitudes a useful predictor of patterns of violence in civil wars? A prominent debate has emerged among scholars and practitioners about the importance of winning civilian "hearts and minds" for influencing their wartime behavior. We argue that such efforts may have a dark side: insurgents can use pro-counterinsurgent attitudes as cues to select their targets and tactics. We conduct an original survey experiment in 204 Afghan villages to establish a positive association between pro-International Security Assistance Force attitudes and future Taliban attacks. We then extend analysis to 14,606 non-surveyed villages to demonstrate that our measure of civilian attitudes improves out-of-sample predictive performance by 20-30% over a standard forecasting model. The results are especially strong for Taliban attacks with improvised explosive devices. These improvements in predictive power remain even after accounting for possible confounders, including past violence, military bases, and economic assistance."

The overall finding may be intuitively easy to accept: insurgents and counterinsurgents are trying to gain control over an area, therefore a successful "heart and minds" will trigger a response. However, the study highlights not only the dynamic nature of targeting but also of tactics and how exposure of risk varies (from targeted to indiscriminate attacks).While a single study a theory might not make, it is clear that insurgency targeting and decision making processes need further analysis and understanding.

  

The findings of the study do have many policy and programming consequences:

In many cases our risk matrix identifies things that could go wrong but rarely the risk of success and how to mitigate it (not the success but the risk). Do No Harm approaches do have some understanding of this but usually as a preventative measure (insurgents may prevent us implementation) and not necessarily as a result.

The forecasting power of the model is also quite interesting. Again, not only for counter-insurgency actors but also for development actors. If we can forecast the use of specific tactics as per changes in attitudes, implementation tools and modalities can vary over time to adapt to the changing risk. I.e. triggering Mine Risk Education activities (focused on IEDs) or switching to small group/household level meetings (to avoid large gatherings) in locations when an attitude indicator reaches certain level. Early Warning systems can also benefit from this model.

On the issue of transferability, I think the concept/methodology does lend itself to be used in other contexts, but of course the need for adapting it to the local insurgency tactics (not all insurgencies may respond the same way to successful hearts and minds due to operational, political or social constrains). It is also important to accept the adaptive nature of tactics and that they don't remain fix in time. Tactics evolve over time, sometimes as a response, sometimes due to technology/knowledge transfer; therefore both the programming and the forecasting teams will need to revise and analyze the model and results regularly.

Finally, development and security need to go together in the cases where development can be understood as undermining insurgencies' hold on a contested location. Many (most) NGOs make the claim of neutrality and also assume that working directly with beneficiaries or local 'communities' is also neutral. However, this may not be the way they are perceived by either local population and insurgents (and counterinsurgents for that matter). Ignorance on how our operations may alter local power dynamics not only puts our staff at risk, but also the wider population, as the study shows.

Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness - Working Paper

 Alec Worsnop's paper "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness" is very much a work in progress and yet giving us already some interesting insights into insurgency from the organizational stand point. Abstract below:
 

"The United States and other members of the international community have expended billions of dollars and thousands of lives confronting insurgent organizations across the globe. Strikingly, however, there has been little systematic analysis of how some insurgent organizations have developed and maintained the military capacity to challenge superior military forces. Thus, this dissertation project is motivated by a fundamental question: What explains why some insurgent organizations are more militarily effective than others? Building on the study of conventional militaries, informal and formal institutions, and sub-state conflict, I focus on the centrality of organizational characteristics in determining military effectiveness. This organizational focus is driven by the observation that while structural and material factors may play a role in explaining the capacity of military actors, the most important factor is how organizations are able to utilize what they have.

This chapter constructs a comprehensive theory accounting for the importance of both informal structures of community support and formal military structures such as logistics, command and control, and personnel management systems in explaining how some insurgent organizations achieve relatively high levels of military effectiveness and others do not. In particular, to achieve base levels of effectiveness, I argue that insurgents must use formal elements to actively link themselves to the informal networks within the organization. In addition, this framework uncovers two understudied potential insurgent development pathways. First, organizations built around weak communities are not destined to become ineffective military forces. Instead, they may compensate for a lack of strong bonding ties of trust by constructing informal structures and legitimacy. Second, organizations surrounded by strong pre-existing communities may not develop into effective military entities. Organizations surrounded by strong communities can only benefit from them if they act to leverage those bonds and complement them with dedicated formal military structures"

 While we all eagerly wait for the final paper, some initial thoughts and comments on my side. Organizational effectiveness is a key component of insurgent groups that is sometimes hidden by the military action itself or media perceptions. An organizational approach to insurgency does have some interesting policy implications:
- If the aim of the counter-insurgency operation is to find a negotiated solution, one has to defeat the insurgency "enough" to bring them to the table but not degrade its operational capability to the point that it loses control of it own units.
- In environments where communities are weak, insurgent organizations have to invest in indoctrination, thus creating a bond/cohesion within the units. A dynamic not explored in the paper but that may play a role would be "pre-recruitment" indoctrination. ISIL, Al-Qaeda and other groups use of the media and propaganda as a recruitment tool and also as a norm-setting channel; new recruits have already internalized some of the norms and values of the organization by the time they joined.
- It would also explain why, among weak communities, insurgent groups are so public about disciplinary procedures (i.e. ISIL and Al-Shabab executions of deserters, collaborators or abuses of power). They need to send the message not only within its ranks but also in the wider community and hence establishing a norm.
- When formal militaries have very low levels of cohesion, counter-insurgency leans on Popular Committees (i.e. Yemen) and Self Defense Groups (i.e. Algeria). Interestingly enough, these groups have parallel organizational issues to that of insurgents.
- In the case of strong counter-insurgency, the paradox is that it may lead to a more effective (militarily) insurgency as it creates more chances from battle-learning and promotion and more positions within the organization are taken by the military wing over the political one. Timing, sequencing and tempo of military counterinsurgency should take that into account.
- Stronger communities can provide an important impetus to insurgencies if there is organizational capabilities and objectives are aligned; however, if the communities changes their alignment, the insurgency can be seriously undermined by the competing bonds and relations of its members (i.e. Iraq Awakening). Therefore a counterinsurgency strategy should take into account the community strength (like in Somalia where there are locations where clans structures remain strong while others it has been seriously undermined)

 

Yemen Update

Back to square 2? (this is assuming that the peace agreement is square 1). The Houthi have now rejected the appointment of Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak (President Hadi's Chief of Staff) as prime minister.
This refusal will probably further delay the implementation of the two-week old deal that called for the withdrawal of Houthi fighters from Sanaa, after they overrun the capital.
While the stated reason for refusal seems quite fuzzy (no official agreement and not the will of the people), this will probably stoke fears of Houthi influence and expansion beyond their current area. Bin Mubarak, from Aden and a representative from the Southern Movement, would have presented the image of unity (he is also the secretary general of the national dialogue) and appeased fears of Houthi take over. Not any more.

In the meantime, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seems to have launched an offensive in Baida governorate (or at least a wave of attacks yesterday). This may be a show of strength after multiple car bombs last week and an appeal to Sunnis to join them in the fight against the Houthi/Shia (that AQAP has been maintaining for a while). If the Houthi-goverment peace agreement doesn't hold or it is seen as ineffective, further pressure from AQAP will undermine state structures and provide a coup de grace to an already very delicate balance.


These are interesting times for those that follow Yemen.

Propaganda war: ISIL and beheadings

Yet another beheading by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) of a foreigner have been distributed this week, and yet another round of condemnation by world leaders and large coverage by the media. On the other hand may other executions go barely noticed ("ISIS executes 31 people in 10 days" by the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights), including human rights activists (although Al-Munaimi's death did get some coverage) and journalists (10 journalist have been murdered in Syria so far, 2 of them western). Granted there is always some bias, we all ignore/skim through news that we have no personal investment in. And there is where ISIL is successfully playing to our own assumptions and unwittingly becoming their propagandist. Executions of foreigners are carefully staged and edited for international distribution, and both the social and mainstream media are the channels. They piggyback on public opinion outrage and condemnation to send a message to their real target group.

For whom are they producing this videos then? What is the purpose of this media campaign? their intended audience is not the global public opinion or political leadership, but the disillusioned or already radicalized. They are recruiting!! In a world of competing groups and ideologies, their message is clear: uncompromising, willing to go to the end and face the westerners and their allies, the real thing comparing with Al-Qaeda. And we are seeing the strategy is wildly successful!! recruitment and "brand value" (within their target group) have increased and it has been yet another argument for western re-intervention/airstrikes in Iraq (that further reinforces their message... they are the only ones fighting the West and been branded the biggest threat!).
On the other hand, executions of Syrian and Iraqi nationals tend to aim at suppressing dissent, population control and punishing desertion or collaboration. These videos are more for local consumption and therefore not as elaborate or staged.

All the talk about counter-insurgency being the rage, and yet, time and again, western elites keep focusing on "hearts and minds" of their own middle classes and intellectuals rather than focusing on these groups ability to appeal, grow and gather resources. The few attempts made (like France's use of the term Daesh, or USA's effort to counter radicalization) seem to be an ad hoc responses rather than part of a wider strategy. Interestingly, maybe it is at the financial level where most advances in counter-insurgency, probably because it is not as mediatized.

Of course ISIL's strategy is not new and many groups have used similar tactics in history to drum up support and recruit. Acknowledging it and responding with a counter-strategy remains essential.
Maybe we should go back to Superman vs the Ku Klux Klan (Drunk History for an irreverent reenactment) or the Cold War, to relearn media strategies and (counter)propaganda tools.