Interesting links of the week
- Winning elections one knock at a time, the importance of ground work/canvassing.
- Skeptics guide to institutions, 4 parts so far.
- Spain ranks highest in financial access according to this new study
- Chinese military classics on the economics of peace and war
- The myth of Armchair Socialist debunked?
- Development professionals and their (our) behavioral biases
Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts
Sunday, 14 December 2014
Wednesday, 12 November 2014
Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls - Paper
'Hearts and Minds' is a much used term in counterinsurgency discussions, originating from a now famous sentence by Gerald Templar on the Malayan Emergency. The battle for local public opinion becoming as important, or more, as military operations. Cohen puts that assumption to the test in "Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls" by analyzing local perceptions during three conflicts: Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Abstract
Abstract
"Despite
all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency,
local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields
surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam,
Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less
malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success,
and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern
counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need
to be rethought"
What the paper shows is that changes of perception actually follow and are not a precursor to effective military operations, even more, in some cases those changes in public opinion do lag behind in time even if important improvements in security have taken place (by objective indicators). While it has always been difficult to measure both psychological warfare and 'hearts and minds' approaches in times of conflict, the author's analysis does indicate the need, at least, of successful military operations/outcomes in order to turn public opinion. However, I do find the interpretation of 'hearts and minds' somewhat restrictive as it goes beyond the media/community engagement part of it and also includes how military operations are conducted (specially in relation to the community). Also the criticism against the concept of 'uncommitted third' (the section of the population sitting on the fence between two contenders) feels more of nitpicking (should it be the 'uncommitted fourth' or 'fifth'?) rather than actually making the case against it. The fact (even as per the polling analyzed by the author) that there is a section of the population that over time changes alignments and allegiances (whether previously committed or not) has been shown in each human conflict. The 'uncommitted third' concept at the end of the day is a simplification of the acceptance that there is a dynamic environment and competition for the space.
'Hearts and Minds' strategist may have fallen into their own rhetoric by allowing their perceptions shape reality. Maybe they have become a case of successful 'hearts and minds', where the behavior is changed by the mind rather than force. In my opinion, this doesn't undermine 'hearts and minds' as a concept but rather show the difficulty of a full understanding and implementation. Finding the balance between the coercing and convincing is not easy, and, as the study shows, maybe there has to be some coercing before the convincing works.
What the paper shows is that changes of perception actually follow and are not a precursor to effective military operations, even more, in some cases those changes in public opinion do lag behind in time even if important improvements in security have taken place (by objective indicators). While it has always been difficult to measure both psychological warfare and 'hearts and minds' approaches in times of conflict, the author's analysis does indicate the need, at least, of successful military operations/outcomes in order to turn public opinion. However, I do find the interpretation of 'hearts and minds' somewhat restrictive as it goes beyond the media/community engagement part of it and also includes how military operations are conducted (specially in relation to the community). Also the criticism against the concept of 'uncommitted third' (the section of the population sitting on the fence between two contenders) feels more of nitpicking (should it be the 'uncommitted fourth' or 'fifth'?) rather than actually making the case against it. The fact (even as per the polling analyzed by the author) that there is a section of the population that over time changes alignments and allegiances (whether previously committed or not) has been shown in each human conflict. The 'uncommitted third' concept at the end of the day is a simplification of the acceptance that there is a dynamic environment and competition for the space.
'Hearts and Minds' strategist may have fallen into their own rhetoric by allowing their perceptions shape reality. Maybe they have become a case of successful 'hearts and minds', where the behavior is changed by the mind rather than force. In my opinion, this doesn't undermine 'hearts and minds' as a concept but rather show the difficulty of a full understanding and implementation. Finding the balance between the coercing and convincing is not easy, and, as the study shows, maybe there has to be some coercing before the convincing works.
Monday, 10 November 2014
Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan - Article
Us, development types, rarely look at the military's experience in stabilization and counterinsurgency (COIN). It is unfortunate because many of the dynamics and constrains they face are not that dissimilar from our work in Community Driven Recovery and local peacebuilding. Briggs' article "Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan" is a case in point where cross-learning may be of use.
Abstract
"This
article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in
Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special
Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province,
Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and
failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment
in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes
of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The
article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the
overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting
factor to success"
Key take-away notes.
Know your context: Tribal governance, relations with both insurgents and central government, and conflicts within the district are key to understand what is going on.
Population? which population?: COIN claims that is population centric, and that is fair enough. However, as the article points out, the center of gravity regarding insurgency in the district was actually not at the district center. We tend to focus on visible sources of 'power' like concentration of houses, markets or official buildings around which we build our activities... and while this locations may serve multiple purposes for the community, it may not be as relevant for the issue at hand (be that counterinsurgency or building a water well). Also depending on how we define population (and their representatives) we run the risk of mis-identifying or ignoring key stakeholders.
Local Economy: While local sourcing seems like a great idea, in practice it can lead to inflation and higher costs for local population (let alone dependence). How external resources are injected into a local economy is very important.
Governance: There are already governance mechanisms in place, however many of the linkages are broken and are a source of mistrust and conflict. Reestablishing those links, specially around dispute/grievance resolution, dialogue and information flow is paramount.
While this article per se is not telling us much new (if I were to venture a guess, the major outcome of this is bonus points for the author for publishing), even from the military point of view (how relevant is Naval Special Warfare to the article, I still don't know); it also highlights common issues that we encounter in conflict or post-conflict areas. This requires us to design and implement with very context-based lens (that allegedly we already do!!).
The article also shows that the military, like the development business, keeps reinventing the wheel time after time... but that is whole different debate regarding organizational learning, mission setting and leadership.
Saturday, 11 October 2014
Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness - Working Paper
Alec Worsnop's paper "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness" is very much a work in progress and yet giving us already some interesting insights into insurgency from the organizational stand point. Abstract below:
"The United States and other members of the international community have expended billions of dollars and thousands of lives confronting insurgent organizations across the globe. Strikingly, however, there has been little systematic analysis of how some insurgent organizations have developed and maintained the military capacity to challenge superior military forces. Thus, this dissertation project is motivated by a fundamental question: What explains why some insurgent organizations are more militarily effective than others? Building on the study of conventional militaries, informal and formal institutions, and sub-state conflict, I focus on the centrality of organizational characteristics in determining military effectiveness. This organizational focus is driven by the observation that while structural and material factors may play a role in explaining the capacity of military actors, the most important factor is how organizations are able to utilize what they have.
This chapter constructs a comprehensive theory accounting for the importance of both informal structures of community support and formal military structures such as logistics, command and control, and personnel management systems in explaining how some insurgent organizations achieve relatively high levels of military effectiveness and others do not. In particular, to achieve base levels of effectiveness, I argue that insurgents must use formal elements to actively link themselves to the informal networks within the organization. In addition, this framework uncovers two understudied potential insurgent development pathways. First, organizations built around weak communities are not destined to become ineffective military forces. Instead, they may compensate for a lack of strong bonding ties of trust by constructing informal structures and legitimacy. Second, organizations surrounded by strong pre-existing communities may not develop into effective military entities. Organizations surrounded by strong communities can only benefit from them if they act to leverage those bonds and complement them with dedicated formal military structures"
While we all eagerly wait for the final paper, some initial thoughts and comments on my side. Organizational effectiveness is a key component of insurgent groups that is sometimes hidden by the military action itself or media perceptions. An organizational approach to insurgency does have some interesting policy implications:
- If the aim of the counter-insurgency operation is to find a negotiated solution, one has to defeat the insurgency "enough" to bring them to the table but not degrade its operational capability to the point that it loses control of it own units.
- In environments where communities are weak, insurgent organizations have to invest in indoctrination, thus creating a bond/cohesion within the units. A dynamic not explored in the paper but that may play a role would be "pre-recruitment" indoctrination. ISIL, Al-Qaeda and other groups use of the media and propaganda as a recruitment tool and also as a norm-setting channel; new recruits have already internalized some of the norms and values of the organization by the time they joined.
- It would also explain why, among weak communities, insurgent groups are so public about disciplinary procedures (i.e. ISIL and Al-Shabab executions of deserters, collaborators or abuses of power). They need to send the message not only within its ranks but also in the wider community and hence establishing a norm.
- When formal militaries have very low levels of cohesion, counter-insurgency leans on Popular Committees (i.e. Yemen) and Self Defense Groups (i.e. Algeria). Interestingly enough, these groups have parallel organizational issues to that of insurgents.
- In the case of strong counter-insurgency, the paradox is that it may lead to a more effective (militarily) insurgency as it creates more chances from battle-learning and promotion and more positions within the organization are taken by the military wing over the political one. Timing, sequencing and tempo of military counterinsurgency should take that into account.
- Stronger communities can provide an important impetus to insurgencies if there is organizational capabilities and objectives are aligned; however, if the communities changes their alignment, the insurgency can be seriously undermined by the competing bonds and relations of its members (i.e. Iraq Awakening). Therefore a counterinsurgency strategy should take into account the community strength (like in Somalia where there are locations where clans structures remain strong while others it has been seriously undermined)
"The United States and other members of the international community have expended billions of dollars and thousands of lives confronting insurgent organizations across the globe. Strikingly, however, there has been little systematic analysis of how some insurgent organizations have developed and maintained the military capacity to challenge superior military forces. Thus, this dissertation project is motivated by a fundamental question: What explains why some insurgent organizations are more militarily effective than others? Building on the study of conventional militaries, informal and formal institutions, and sub-state conflict, I focus on the centrality of organizational characteristics in determining military effectiveness. This organizational focus is driven by the observation that while structural and material factors may play a role in explaining the capacity of military actors, the most important factor is how organizations are able to utilize what they have.
This chapter constructs a comprehensive theory accounting for the importance of both informal structures of community support and formal military structures such as logistics, command and control, and personnel management systems in explaining how some insurgent organizations achieve relatively high levels of military effectiveness and others do not. In particular, to achieve base levels of effectiveness, I argue that insurgents must use formal elements to actively link themselves to the informal networks within the organization. In addition, this framework uncovers two understudied potential insurgent development pathways. First, organizations built around weak communities are not destined to become ineffective military forces. Instead, they may compensate for a lack of strong bonding ties of trust by constructing informal structures and legitimacy. Second, organizations surrounded by strong pre-existing communities may not develop into effective military entities. Organizations surrounded by strong communities can only benefit from them if they act to leverage those bonds and complement them with dedicated formal military structures"
While we all eagerly wait for the final paper, some initial thoughts and comments on my side. Organizational effectiveness is a key component of insurgent groups that is sometimes hidden by the military action itself or media perceptions. An organizational approach to insurgency does have some interesting policy implications:
- If the aim of the counter-insurgency operation is to find a negotiated solution, one has to defeat the insurgency "enough" to bring them to the table but not degrade its operational capability to the point that it loses control of it own units.
- In environments where communities are weak, insurgent organizations have to invest in indoctrination, thus creating a bond/cohesion within the units. A dynamic not explored in the paper but that may play a role would be "pre-recruitment" indoctrination. ISIL, Al-Qaeda and other groups use of the media and propaganda as a recruitment tool and also as a norm-setting channel; new recruits have already internalized some of the norms and values of the organization by the time they joined.
- It would also explain why, among weak communities, insurgent groups are so public about disciplinary procedures (i.e. ISIL and Al-Shabab executions of deserters, collaborators or abuses of power). They need to send the message not only within its ranks but also in the wider community and hence establishing a norm.
- When formal militaries have very low levels of cohesion, counter-insurgency leans on Popular Committees (i.e. Yemen) and Self Defense Groups (i.e. Algeria). Interestingly enough, these groups have parallel organizational issues to that of insurgents.
- In the case of strong counter-insurgency, the paradox is that it may lead to a more effective (militarily) insurgency as it creates more chances from battle-learning and promotion and more positions within the organization are taken by the military wing over the political one. Timing, sequencing and tempo of military counterinsurgency should take that into account.
- Stronger communities can provide an important impetus to insurgencies if there is organizational capabilities and objectives are aligned; however, if the communities changes their alignment, the insurgency can be seriously undermined by the competing bonds and relations of its members (i.e. Iraq Awakening). Therefore a counterinsurgency strategy should take into account the community strength (like in Somalia where there are locations where clans structures remain strong while others it has been seriously undermined)
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