Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls - Paper

'Hearts and Minds' is a much used term in counterinsurgency discussions, originating from a now famous sentence by Gerald Templar on the Malayan Emergency. The battle for local public opinion becoming as important, or more, as military operations. Cohen puts that assumption to the test in "Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls" by analyzing local perceptions during three conflicts: Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
 
Abstract

"Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought"

What the paper shows is that changes of perception actually follow and are not a precursor to effective military operations, even more, in some cases those changes in public opinion do lag behind in time even if important improvements in security have taken place (by objective indicators). While it has always been difficult to measure both psychological warfare and 'hearts and minds' approaches in times of conflict, the author's analysis does indicate the need, at least, of successful military operations/outcomes in order to turn public opinion. However, I do find the interpretation of 'hearts and minds' somewhat restrictive as it goes beyond the media/community engagement part of it and also includes how military operations are conducted (specially in relation to the community). Also the criticism against the concept of 'uncommitted third' (the section of the population sitting on the fence between two contenders) feels more of nitpicking (should it be the 'uncommitted fourth' or 'fifth'?) rather than actually making the case against it. The fact (even as per the polling analyzed by the author) that there is a section of the population that over time changes alignments and allegiances (whether previously committed or not) has been shown in each human conflict. The 'uncommitted third' concept at the end of the day is a simplification of the acceptance that there is a dynamic environment and competition for the space.

'Hearts and Minds' strategist may have fallen into their own rhetoric by allowing their perceptions shape reality. Maybe they have become a case of successful 'hearts and minds', where the behavior is changed by the mind rather than force. In my opinion, this doesn't undermine 'hearts and minds' as a concept but rather show the difficulty of a full understanding and implementation. Finding the balance between the coercing and convincing is not easy, and, as the study shows, maybe there has to be some coercing before the convincing works.