Transtional Justice and Political Settlements - Working Paper

Transitions are as hard, or maybe even harder, that the negotiated processes that originated them (peace and/or political agreements) Christine Bell's "Transitional Justice and Political Settlements" look into the role that transitional justice places both in the negotiating table and its aftermath.

Abstract:     

"This draft article examines the role of transitional justice in societies emerging from conflict. Fundamentally, it addresses the ways in which the context of conflict resolution shapes the transitional justice mechanisms which emerge and constrains their implementation. The paper argues that transitional justice measures need to be understood as having a critical political settlement dimension, and as closely intertwined with the bargaining processes of political elites. These processes are important to non-repetition of human rights violations. The paper sets out the factors which influence design of transitional justice mechanisms, and in conclusion it suggests strategies for improving international intervention in the area."

The article follows a long discussion between the peace imperative (ending the conflict) and the rights-based approach imperative (respect of human rights and justice) that has been going on for a while. These two imperatives are at odds mostly because they come about from different perspectives, one is a bargaining process among the stakeholders while the latter is a normative/principled process (with very little room for negotiation). While this discussion is not new, what Bell brings into the table is that transitional justice mechanisms are, in their design and implementation, also bargaining processes and a continuation of conflict objectives. The fact that the external appearance of the mechanism may similar across countries (Truth Commissions, Special Tribunals, etc..) should not blind us to the fact they represent a political dynamic and are shaped by the narrative of both the conflict and the aimed future.

Overall is a call to more contextual knowledge in both design and intervention, a point that everybody agrees with and yet we keep falling short time and again.

Interesting links

Links of the week:

- Salaries and NGOs (no, money ain't all). Study on incentives for NGO workers in Uganda

- 10 thing political scientist know that you don't (in the USA) 

- Kony 2012 aftermath, Why did Invisible Children dissolve?

- Lobster fishing or lobster farming? 80% of Maine lobster diet is bait?

Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities - Working Paper

While, in general, I am not keen on social science results coming out of controlled lab experiments, Engel and Rockenbach's "Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities" offer an interesting though with potential large implications (if proven by field testing) for development practitioners.

 
Abstract:  

"We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions when it would be most desirable, i.e. with a positive externality. Here, participants vote for high contributions, yet compliance is poor. Unfavorable payoff comparisons to the outsiders that gain a windfall profit drive contributions down."

In many development interventions, specially with the popularity of Community Driven Development (CDD), communities are asked to chose priorities and, in some cases, also contribute to them. Those priorities usually reflect public goods (or rather public services that can have a public good component, like schools, medical posts, markets, community centers) that do have externalities on other communities (or even within the community). Unfortunately, in development we tend to treat externalities either as a risk (other communities/actors reacting negatively, spoilers) or as a multiplier-effect (bonus points because there is a positive spill-over beyond the community) but rarely as something integral to the design of the decision-making process and the community contribution (both at initial stage and on running costs).

The study shows that enforcement of decisions is key (nothing new there) but also that voting and the nature of the externality have an effect on contributions: If negative it lowers (acknowledgement of impact on others?), if positive it also lowers!! (why should we pay for those free riders?) and if neutral increases (it is all ours?).

In my view policy implications are multiple: 

1) we need to field test this hypothesis, 

2) we may need to tailor decision-making processes and corresponding contributions according to externalities (assuming we want to maximize community contribution). Of course this is easier said that done, specially in CDD settings where the prioritization outcome is not necessarily known beforehand (although the guessing can be quite narrow),

3) extend voting to all contributors. While this point is not looked into by the study, the fact that there might be contributor not participating in the decision-making (indirectly so, through the non-binding phase), we can assume that shifting them from semi-bystanders to decision-makers/contributors would increase the compliance (a point made in many studies in political science on broadening the voting franchise AND the tax base),

4) in stable systems, both and positive negative externalities are dealt by shifting the decision-making process to a higher level (district, region, nation) that can provide for a compensatory system (insurance, investments, balancing out positive and negative externalities). However, in many development settings a 'bump-up the ladder' is not an efficient option (and a whole different 'governance' debate). Clustering (identifying and including affected parties) for decision-making and contributions (in the case of positive externalities) would make the public good neutral (and raise contributions). For negative externalities it is much harder unless the potential damage has been pre-identified and a compensatory mechanism already established (i.e. another development project in the affected community, mitigation measures).

Interesting links

Interesting links of the week

- Winning elections one knock at a time, the importance of ground work/canvassing.

- Skeptics guide to institutions, 4 parts so far.

- Spain ranks highest in financial access according to this new study

- Chinese military classics on the economics of peace and war

- The myth of Armchair Socialist debunked?

- Development professionals and their (our) behavioral biases