Interesting links

Links of the week:

- Salaries and NGOs (no, money ain't all). Study on incentives for NGO workers in Uganda

- 10 thing political scientist know that you don't (in the USA) 

- Kony 2012 aftermath, Why did Invisible Children dissolve?

- Lobster fishing or lobster farming? 80% of Maine lobster diet is bait?

Interesting links

Interesting links of the week

- Winning elections one knock at a time, the importance of ground work/canvassing.

- Skeptics guide to institutions, 4 parts so far.

- Spain ranks highest in financial access according to this new study

- Chinese military classics on the economics of peace and war

- The myth of Armchair Socialist debunked?

- Development professionals and their (our) behavioral biases

Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups - Paper

Thurber's "Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups" highlights the issue of labels and trying to fit everything into an specific world view does not actually help in understanding conflict dynamics, or state formation/legitimacy for that matter. This paper can be read together with the previously commented "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness"

Abstract

"The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence"

By labeling militias as warlords, paramilitaries or foreign proxies (or terrorist, if it fits the political agenda), we are simplifying the role that some of them play. While historically some militias have been part of statebuilding process, the view nowadays is that they are rather an indicator of state's weakness and lack of full sovereignty. As the author points out, militias with a strong sociopolitical foundation do have a representational/political role to play on behalf their communities. Instead of dealing with them just with military means, a wider approach that takes into account the community aspirations is much needed. Hence, sociopolitical militias life cycle is part of an ebb and flow of relations between the state and the community: when the state addresses community needs, then the militia weakens. However, if the state is weak, the militia gains importance as provider of security and social services. The paradox comes when the militia replaces the state, as they tend to over-reach (abuse of violence, fundamentalist policies, lack of adequate checks and balances) and increase the discontent among the community (breaking the internal coalition of support), therefore bringing another militia or the state back into play. From this perspective, militia's strengths and structure as an opposition group does not prepare it for a governing role.

I find interesting that the author's focus on the Shia seems to sideline the fact that a similar dynamics of Sunni sociopolitical militias might be growing in response to the Shia preponderance within the government and the role of Shia militias.

The paper also gives an interesting primer on Iraq Shia dynamics. I thought there were only two Sadrs, but if fact there are three. 

Drivers of Entrepreneurship and Post-Entry Performance of Newborn Firms in Developing Countries - Working Paper

Quatraro and Vivarelli offer us a review of the latest research in "Drivers of Entrepreneurship and Post-Entry Performance of Newborn Firms in Developing Countries", that I believe bring some interesting questions around livelihoods and local economic development and also tags along nicely to my previous post on "Non-Farm Enterprises"

Abstract:     

"The aim of this paper is to provide an updated survey of the "state of the art" in entrepreneurial studies with a particular focus on developing countries (DCs). In particular, the concept of "entrepreneurship" is critically discussed, followed by a discussion of the institutional, macroeconomic, and microeconomic conditions that affect the entry of new firms and the post-entry performance of newborn firms. The reviewed literature bears some policy implications for the support of the creation new firms, such as the targeting of policy measures to prospective entrepreneurs who possess high education levels, long previous job experience, and innovative skills. Specifically, for DCs, tailored subsidies and support should be coupled with framework and infrastructural policies that are able to improve the business environment such that new ventures can start and grow."

Findings of relevance for programming are:
- Minimum Efficient Scale (Size matters). Risk of failure dramatically drops once it gets to its MES. Programming could be built around benchmarks like MES that allow for reallocation of resources towards more at risk business, instead of a fixed/same across the board timeline. This would also imply that each business may have a different growth objective/requirement (and not just slightly above break even) depending on the sector.
- Previous experience in the sector. While this may seem an obvious, sometimes selection criteria for interventions are based on needs rather than chances of success. Programme design has to be clear on what is aiming for (temporary relief or longer term livelihood) and act accordingly. 
- Financial. Credit constrains may have been overplayed as an obstacle to enterprise survival and maybe the focus should be more on savings rather than borrowing. Microfinance user may actually using it in that manner, as some studies have shown negative returns (they may actually be losing money) but positive savings (they save money in comparison with the previous situation). There is an increasing shift towards savings but the rethoric still remains around credit constrains.
- Education is a mixed bag. Higher level education reduces the chances of starting up, probably because the first preference is salaried labour (and seeking to avoid defensive entrepreneurship) that education gives access to. On the other hand, education is a high predictor of business growth and survival. It is interesting to note that there is a "threshold effect" depending on context/location, were there is a minimum level of education that leads to faster growth. Being able to identify that level for the target area may help in yielding better results. Then again we encounter the issue of selection criteria and programming priorities.
- Unemployment is negatively correlated with enterprise survival. Previous unemployment increases the risk of failure and tends to be linked to lower economic outcomes and job creation. Much programming is built around entrepreneurship for unemployed youth, wouldn't it be better to have a two staged/tiered system where unemployed would initially be waged labour (and gaining sector experience at the same time) before start-up is considered?
- Minorities. I am troubled with their recommendation of specific support to entrepreneurial minorities. While this may make sense from an economic point of view (building on an existing strength), the political and social risks of such actions can be large. Business minorities have been violently targeted even in recent times, and a policy that singles them out in a sector they may already have a comparative advantage will only fuel negative perceptions.

   

Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia - Paper

Plenty of ink has been spilled about Al-Shabab and the Somali context (not that we notice much difference most of the time); Botha and Abdile's "Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia" look at one key organizational development component: Recruitment. Summary below.

"Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab’s rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government, countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab."

The study doesn't really offer a novel insight into Al-Shabab's recruitment, it is a much needed reminder that many core issues that fuel radicalization are still ongoing. 88 former fighters were interviewed (plus 7 off-the-record), therefore it remains to be seen if the fact that they are not fighting anymore may give us a biased sample. Nevertheless it is a valuable attempt. However, I would have preferred to include a "control" sample of Somalis that did not join Al-Shabab, this way we can compare if the reasons for joining are unique for this group or shared across Somalia: i.e. if economic reasons are given for joining (it is the leading reason), then how different are the people that joined to those that didn't (probably not much) and therefore how relevant it may be as a reason.

The study highlights the usual suspects and some interesting points:
- economic incentives as positions within Al-Shabab are remunerated (crime does pay), and many of them would see it as a career path.
- propaganda, specially the perception that Islam is under threat mixed with nationalism (Christians invading the country)
- Status/empowerment, specially for marginalized youth and minority clans. Al-Shabab represents respect. It is also able to provide a sense of belonging and a common purpose (that affects retention of recruits, although the money did help)
- Fear and anger as driving emotions for recruitment 
- Peer networks are the source of contact and not family networks. Many would join through a friend and rarely through a family member. Interesting point in a society where family/clan are so important, and maybe the breakdown of that relationship is a leading driver
- There remains a high trust on elders, even though much of Al-Shabab rhetoric and actions tend to undermine that structure. On the other hand they see government as self-interested and illegitimate, being revolt a necessary step.
- Regret (or lack of). Many of the former fighters regretted being caught, and not necessarily joining Al-Shabab (probably linked to the sense of belonging that the organization is able to impress)
- Intelligence. The ability of Al-Shabab to collect intelligence (and act upon it, orchestrating complex operations) has been recognized for a while. That ability is not only an operational asset but it probably also reinforces their capacity to identify and recruit individuals.

The recommendations of the study are pretty much standard (and oft repeated), and yet again barely followed.

Who Runs the International System? Power and the Staffing of the United Nations Secretariat - Working Paper

Novosady and Werkerz's recent paper does confirm many perception of international affairs watchers. "Who Runs the International System? Power and the Sta ffing of the United Nations Secretariat" looks at senior positions (80 out of 43,000 staff) in the United Nations (using the word Secretariat can be a bit misleading as heads of UN agencies also hold senior positions and are counted) and studies how representation (and the respective influence, if we accept the premise) has evolved over the years. Below is the abstract:

"National governments frequently pull strings to get their citizens appointed to senior positions in international institutions. We examine, over a 60 year period, the nationalities of the most senior positions in the United Nations Secretariat, ostensibly the world's most representative international institution. The results indicate which nations are successful in this zero-sum game, and what national characteristics correlate with power in international institutions. The most overrepresented countries are small, rich democracies like the Nordic countries. Statistically, democracy, investment in diplomacy, and economic/military power are predictors of senior positions - even after controlling for the U.N. staffing mandate of competence and integrity. National control over the United Nations is remarkably sticky; however the influence of the United States has diminished as U.S. ideology has shifted away from its early allies. In spite of the decline in U.S. influence, the Secretariat remains pro-American relative to the world at large."

The fact that Western countries (and Nordic ones specifically) are overrepresented (45% of positions) is an easy observation to make. The decline of United States of America presence does also match with perception of anti-UN rhetoric, I actually expected it to be under-represented however it is not the case (proof that words and actions do not always go together). US decline has been compensated by increase of Western presence and not necessarily by an increase of diversity; in light of that, the authors explore influence through like-minded countries or alliances, showing continued US influence until the 80s. However, increased divergence between the US and its allies on global issues in recent times have taken its toll; and from 1981 to 2007, "Secretariat affinity with the U.S. remains largely negative, with a slight upturn during the Clinton administration and a monotonic fall during the subsequent Bush years".
Nevertheless, the Secretariat remains with a pro-US bias. Here the authors make an interesting comparison with UNESCO, with which the US have had a conflictive relationship and showing the divergence with the Secretariat on bias.

Overall, they find that democracies, countries that invest in bilateral diplomacy (lets not forget that senior positions are also approved by the General Assembly), and economically/militarily powerful countries are the most effective at placing staff in the Secretariat (assuming this countries also believe there is a value in being represented, that is not a universal feeling). The study does not look at voluntary contributions (specially to Agencies), how they may correlate with presence/influence and how strategic some of this contributions may be by countries (some countries may value certain posts over others, so they may be under-represented in the average but over-represented in certain sectors/agencies).

For those celebrating the election of Spain as a Security Council member for the next couple of years, in terms of share of senior staff posts Spain is ranked 53 (right below Panama and Niger and equal to Guatemala) and once they do a weighted ranking it fall all the way to 81. Maybe the Spanish government believes that more influence can be yielded through a non-permanent seat in the SC that through senior staffing and has allocated the resources accordingly.

Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms - Kenya Working Paper

As practitioners of development and peacebuilding, we usually develop a rule of thumb: "ethnic divisions as a predictor of ...." conflict, lack of trust, implementation inefficiencies, mis-allocation of resources, corruption, [put your own experience/pet theory here]. On the other hand we tend to be very aspirational/principled about diversity and how everybody should be included. Hjort's paper "Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms",in a way, addresses this issue from a business management/productivity in Kenya standpoint.

Abstract

"A body of literature suggests that ethnic heterogeneity limits economic growth. This paper

provides microeconometric evidence on the direct effect of ethnic divisions on productivity. In team production at a plant in Kenya, an upstream worker supplies and distributes flowers to two downstream workers who assemble them into bunches. The plant uses an essentially random rotation process to assign workers to positions, leading to three types of teams: (a) ethnically homogeneous teams, and teams in which (b) one or (c) both downstream workers belong to a tribe in rivalry with the upstream worker's tribe. I find strong evidence that upstream workers undersupply non-coethnic downstream workers (vertical discrimination) and shift flowers from non-coethnic to coethnic downstream workers (horizontal discrimination), at the cost of lower own pay and total output. A period of ethnic conflict following Kenya's 2007 election led to a sharp increase in discrimination. In response, the plant began paying the two downstream workers for their combined output (team pay). This led to a modest output reduction in (a) and (c) teams (as predicted by standard incentive models) but an increase in output in (b) teams, and overall. Workers' behavior before conflict, during conflict, and under team pay is predicted by a model of taste-based discrimination. My findings suggest that inter-ethnic rivalries lower allocative efficiency in the private sector, that the economic costs of ethnic diversity vary with the political environment, and that in high-cost environments firms are forced to adopt "second best" policies to limit discrimination distortions."

Overall, ethnic divisions do reduce productivity both before and during active conflict through discrimination (as measured by output, not by perceptions or declared attitudes). Team design/task allocation does have a impact on the level of decreased productivity in comparison with a fully homogeneous team. Active conflict (in this case the 2007-08 election violence in Kenya) increases the discrimination (although we could have guessed that) but also the discrimination continues afterwards (a certain level of persistence). The firm's "solution" is to switch from individual productivity pay to group pay, a "second-best" option in terms of productivity in comparison to full segregation; but probably a good idea in terms of context, perception and business sustainability.

Implications for our work? Principled diversity without a good institutional design can have very inefficient outcomes (as we have seen, power sharing can be also a predictor of violence). In cases where we are working with divided ethnicities, special attention is required on the incentives to discriminate or not (i.e. group gains vs individual, payment on results rather than functions, etc..). This not only applies to the 'beneficiaries', but may also need to have a hard look inside our own operations and teams; as we tend to operate with HR manuals and processes that have a high personal responsibility component (in the study, the shop managers were not even aware of the extent of productivity differences!)

The author is careful to note that ethnic division, in this case, is a political construct, where an Bantu group (Luhya) alligns with a Nilotic group (Luo), in opposition to another Bantu group (Kikuyu).

HT to Chris Blattman

Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness - Working Paper

 Alec Worsnop's paper "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness" is very much a work in progress and yet giving us already some interesting insights into insurgency from the organizational stand point. Abstract below:
 

"The United States and other members of the international community have expended billions of dollars and thousands of lives confronting insurgent organizations across the globe. Strikingly, however, there has been little systematic analysis of how some insurgent organizations have developed and maintained the military capacity to challenge superior military forces. Thus, this dissertation project is motivated by a fundamental question: What explains why some insurgent organizations are more militarily effective than others? Building on the study of conventional militaries, informal and formal institutions, and sub-state conflict, I focus on the centrality of organizational characteristics in determining military effectiveness. This organizational focus is driven by the observation that while structural and material factors may play a role in explaining the capacity of military actors, the most important factor is how organizations are able to utilize what they have.

This chapter constructs a comprehensive theory accounting for the importance of both informal structures of community support and formal military structures such as logistics, command and control, and personnel management systems in explaining how some insurgent organizations achieve relatively high levels of military effectiveness and others do not. In particular, to achieve base levels of effectiveness, I argue that insurgents must use formal elements to actively link themselves to the informal networks within the organization. In addition, this framework uncovers two understudied potential insurgent development pathways. First, organizations built around weak communities are not destined to become ineffective military forces. Instead, they may compensate for a lack of strong bonding ties of trust by constructing informal structures and legitimacy. Second, organizations surrounded by strong pre-existing communities may not develop into effective military entities. Organizations surrounded by strong communities can only benefit from them if they act to leverage those bonds and complement them with dedicated formal military structures"

 While we all eagerly wait for the final paper, some initial thoughts and comments on my side. Organizational effectiveness is a key component of insurgent groups that is sometimes hidden by the military action itself or media perceptions. An organizational approach to insurgency does have some interesting policy implications:
- If the aim of the counter-insurgency operation is to find a negotiated solution, one has to defeat the insurgency "enough" to bring them to the table but not degrade its operational capability to the point that it loses control of it own units.
- In environments where communities are weak, insurgent organizations have to invest in indoctrination, thus creating a bond/cohesion within the units. A dynamic not explored in the paper but that may play a role would be "pre-recruitment" indoctrination. ISIL, Al-Qaeda and other groups use of the media and propaganda as a recruitment tool and also as a norm-setting channel; new recruits have already internalized some of the norms and values of the organization by the time they joined.
- It would also explain why, among weak communities, insurgent groups are so public about disciplinary procedures (i.e. ISIL and Al-Shabab executions of deserters, collaborators or abuses of power). They need to send the message not only within its ranks but also in the wider community and hence establishing a norm.
- When formal militaries have very low levels of cohesion, counter-insurgency leans on Popular Committees (i.e. Yemen) and Self Defense Groups (i.e. Algeria). Interestingly enough, these groups have parallel organizational issues to that of insurgents.
- In the case of strong counter-insurgency, the paradox is that it may lead to a more effective (militarily) insurgency as it creates more chances from battle-learning and promotion and more positions within the organization are taken by the military wing over the political one. Timing, sequencing and tempo of military counterinsurgency should take that into account.
- Stronger communities can provide an important impetus to insurgencies if there is organizational capabilities and objectives are aligned; however, if the communities changes their alignment, the insurgency can be seriously undermined by the competing bonds and relations of its members (i.e. Iraq Awakening). Therefore a counterinsurgency strategy should take into account the community strength (like in Somalia where there are locations where clans structures remain strong while others it has been seriously undermined)