Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups - Paper

Thurber's "Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups" highlights the issue of labels and trying to fit everything into an specific world view does not actually help in understanding conflict dynamics, or state formation/legitimacy for that matter. This paper can be read together with the previously commented "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness"

Abstract

"The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence"

By labeling militias as warlords, paramilitaries or foreign proxies (or terrorist, if it fits the political agenda), we are simplifying the role that some of them play. While historically some militias have been part of statebuilding process, the view nowadays is that they are rather an indicator of state's weakness and lack of full sovereignty. As the author points out, militias with a strong sociopolitical foundation do have a representational/political role to play on behalf their communities. Instead of dealing with them just with military means, a wider approach that takes into account the community aspirations is much needed. Hence, sociopolitical militias life cycle is part of an ebb and flow of relations between the state and the community: when the state addresses community needs, then the militia weakens. However, if the state is weak, the militia gains importance as provider of security and social services. The paradox comes when the militia replaces the state, as they tend to over-reach (abuse of violence, fundamentalist policies, lack of adequate checks and balances) and increase the discontent among the community (breaking the internal coalition of support), therefore bringing another militia or the state back into play. From this perspective, militia's strengths and structure as an opposition group does not prepare it for a governing role.

I find interesting that the author's focus on the Shia seems to sideline the fact that a similar dynamics of Sunni sociopolitical militias might be growing in response to the Shia preponderance within the government and the role of Shia militias.

The paper also gives an interesting primer on Iraq Shia dynamics. I thought there were only two Sadrs, but if fact there are three. 

How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation - Paper

Although both ISIL and Boko Haram have recently taken the spotlight, the Al Qaeda franchise remains a recognizable actor. Hellmich's paper "How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation" looks into Ben Laden's ideology and how it fits into the wider contemporary Islamic discourse.

Abstract

"This article investigates the contested ideology of al-Qaeda through an analysis of Osama bin Ladin’s writings and public statements issued between 1994 and 2011, set in relation to the development of Islamic thought and changing socio-political realities in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Challenging popular conceptions of Wahhabism and the “Salafi jihad”, it reveals an idealistic, Pan-Islamic sentiment at the core of his messages that is not based on the main schools of Islamic theology, but is the result of a crisis of meaning of Islam in the modern world. Both before and after the death of al-Qaeda’s iconic leader, the continuing process of religious, political and intellectual fragmentation of the Muslim world has led to bin Ladin’s vision for unity being replaced by local factions and individuals pursuing their own agendas in the name of al-Qaeda and Islam."

The demise of the Ottoman Empire (and the sense of unity it carried), secularism/modernization and the expansion of literacy have opened up the Muslim world to an internal crisis/revolution. As individual Muslims increasingly interpret Islam for themselves, without making reference to the traditional schools of Sunni law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii or Hanbali) a divergence within develops. Pan-Islamism, with its core message of Muslim solidarity and the unity of umma, is the message that Ben Laden would send over the world. The appeal he represented was not a radical political/religious ideology (the actual political structure of the future is quite vague) but a social message of solidarity, personal responsibility and victimhood that many Muslims could relate to.

Even before Ben Laden's death, we could see the fragmentation of Al Qaeda along more locally driven agendas under the banner of global action.The fact that most of the victims of Al Qaeda are actually Muslims, the increase fighting along sectarian lines and the more limited objectives of affiliates and franchises show the drift away from Pan-Islamism. Although the rhetoric remains important in order to appeal for funds, foreign fighters and support from the Muslim community, what remains, to paraphrase the known sentence about politics, is that 'all insurgencies are local'. While Al Qaeda's position in the global ranking has diminished, some of the root causes for its appeal are still current and part of the ongoing debate within the Muslim world.

Compulsory Schooling Laws and Formation of Beliefs (?) - Research Paper

While I find the initial results from this paper appealing (confirmation bias?), Pogorelova and Mocan's "Compulsory Schooling Laws and Formation of Beliefs: Education,Religion and Superstition" does present me with some questions. Abstract below:

"We exploit information on compulsory schooling reforms in 11 European countries, implemented in the 1960s and 70s, to identify the impact of education on religious adherence and religious practices. Using micro data from the European Social Survey, conducted in various years between 2002 and 2013, we find consistently large negative effects of schooling on self-reported religiosity, social religious acts (attending religious services), as well as solitary religious acts (the frequency of praying). We also use data from European Values Survey to apply the same empirical design to analyze the impact of schooling on superstitious beliefs. We find that more education, due to increased mandatory years of schooling, reduces individuals’ tendency to believe in the power of lucky charms and the tendency to take into account horoscopes in daily life."

The 11 countries under study for religiosity were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, United Kingdom, Poland, Spain, and West Germany (for the horoscope analysis they only used Austria, France, Greece and Germany). Other countries were not included for methodological reasons. These countries actually give us a wide European cross-section, from Catholic to Protestant and Orthodox, from dictatorships or under Soviet control (at the time of the reform) to democracies, from northern Europe to the Mediterranean. And yet, we have to be careful in extrapolating to non-European contexts (a large gains schooling in Africa and Asia are due to religious schools)

 Firstly, I would say that the study measures religious practice rather than beliefs, unless you count in superstition (depending on your view of religion), that measures both belief and practice. 

It measures two very specific cohorts, maybe it should also do a comparison with overall trends in religiosity or with younger and older cohorts. The period under-study was a major turning point for the Catholic Church (many of the countries analyzed have large Catholic populations) with the Second Vatican Council, that changed rules and norms among Catholics on religious practice and to this day still has open discussions. The Council itself was a response to calls to modernization (and maybe address a trend that the study correlates with schooling)
 

Another point to note is that in many of the countries studied, religious institutions are/where important providers of schooling at the time of the reform. The reform itself could have diminished the influence of religious providers either because of expansion of public schools (I know in Spain the reform was coupled with a wave of school construction), the lack of capacity to actually cover the extra (or two) years of schooling or actual decline of religious/denominational schools (the number Catholic schools in Europe declined 18% between 1975 and 2000)

Measuring superstition is always a tricky affair, are lucky charms and horoscopes (in four countries) sufficient indicators? 

How does schooling and religiosity correlate with other values or beliefs? nationalism, conservatism, capitalism, belief in aliens, etc..?

HT to Chris Blattman

Yemen Update

Back to square 2? (this is assuming that the peace agreement is square 1). The Houthi have now rejected the appointment of Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak (President Hadi's Chief of Staff) as prime minister.
This refusal will probably further delay the implementation of the two-week old deal that called for the withdrawal of Houthi fighters from Sanaa, after they overrun the capital.
While the stated reason for refusal seems quite fuzzy (no official agreement and not the will of the people), this will probably stoke fears of Houthi influence and expansion beyond their current area. Bin Mubarak, from Aden and a representative from the Southern Movement, would have presented the image of unity (he is also the secretary general of the national dialogue) and appeased fears of Houthi take over. Not any more.

In the meantime, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seems to have launched an offensive in Baida governorate (or at least a wave of attacks yesterday). This may be a show of strength after multiple car bombs last week and an appeal to Sunnis to join them in the fight against the Houthi/Shia (that AQAP has been maintaining for a while). If the Houthi-goverment peace agreement doesn't hold or it is seen as ineffective, further pressure from AQAP will undermine state structures and provide a coup de grace to an already very delicate balance.


These are interesting times for those that follow Yemen.

"I want to become Caliph instead of the Caliph"

It seems that Iznogoud (with his famous catchphrase "I want to become Caliph instead of the Caliph") is getting pretty tough competition these days! First it was ISIL/IS/ISIS/Daesh, then Boko Haram and finally (or rather more recently) a refutation from 126 scholars and clerics.
Now I know why my middle-eastern friends would get so worked up when I would mention the Cordoba Caliphate! Well, I am not so sure myself that Abd-ar-Rahman was really the only Umayyad left after the Abbasid killing spree, but that is for others to debate. It seems that, like in Highlander, "there can only be one"!! A Caliphate represents a sovereign state of the Ummah (the entire Muslim community), and given that unity of the faithful is paramount (this could also be a reason my friends were dismissing the Cordoba Caliphate, it was competing directly with the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo and indirectly with the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad) a single leader and entity are required; a bit like the Pope and anti-Pope(s) of Catholic tradition.
One of the key arguments, based on Islamic jurisprudence (Sunni interpretation), against ISIL Caliphate is that it requires general consensus... and so far pretty much of the consensus is against. Maybe good old Al-Baghdadi would have been better off claiming a Shia Caliphate/Imamate where the majority is not necessary as it is divinely chosen (if the genealogy not checked too closely). But I think that bridge is well burnt by now.
Nevertheless, this Caliphate claims are more a political statement with religious connotations rather than the reverse.

Not on whose name?

On Wednesday 24, the President of the USA, Obama, called "for the world -- especially Muslim communities -- to explicitly, forcefully, and consistently reject the ideology of organizations like al Qaeda and ISIL". So on the one hand he says the USA is not waging war against Muslims, but on the other Muslims are the ones 'specially' responsible. One would have thought that so many people, 'specially' Muslims, are being killed by Al Qaeda and ISIL because they explicitly, forcefully consistently reject their ideology!! He then goes on to mention some initiatives by Muslims that are denouncing ISIL like "the young British Muslims who responded to terrorist propaganda by starting the “NotInMyName” campaign". Wait a second! I think I saw that somewhere before! Did he mean the Not In My Name slogan by the Stop the War Coalition? (granted he also spoke out against that war back then), or the Not In My Name Jewish group in Chicago (his Senate seat was from Illinois) seeking a just peace between Israelis and Palestinians? (interestingly the website is inactive since 2006, did they give up?).
Four days later, Obama gave another speech where he said: "...our work is not done when too many children live in crumbling neighborhoods, cycling through substandard schools, traumatized by daily violence...we need to help communities and law enforcement build trust, build understanding, so that our neighborhoods stay safe and our young people stay on track.... we need to address the unique challenges that make it hard for some of our young people to thrive". He was not talking about young unemployed Muslims, budding Islamic terrorists or jihadist sympathizers... he was talking to the Congresional Black Caucus about racial discrimination.
The selective use of collective responsibility does a disservice for millions of Muslims that don't condone Al Qaeda or ISIL, and dismisses societal dynamics at play in many of these countries.

I am not saying that religion does not play a role in how societal forces interact (to the contrary, for example Catholicism is seen as a reactionary movement by many Europeans, and Buddhist monks have been inciting to violence in Burma), but rather that there are many other variables that are as relevant or more to understanding conflict and violence: resource allocation and access, governance, discrimination, status, injustice, etc... As Blair's (it is a good quote to reconnect with the Not In My Name Iraq theme!) New Labour 97 Manifesto famous slogan "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime" insisted on "individual responsibility for crime" and attacking "the causes of crime by ...our measures to relieve social deprivation";  Obama has reversed (paraphreversed?) it into a Muslim collective responsibility for terrorism and also a cause of it.