Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia?: Learning from the 2011 famine - Interim Paper

An interesting paper looking at the 2011 Somalia crisis, Maxwell and Majid's "Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia?: Learning from the 2011 famine" goes straight to the point. An easy read that serves also as a primer for humanitarian dynamics in the country.

Intro:
"In July 2014, humanitarian agencies and the government of Somalia warned of a new severe drought in Somalia, only three years after more than 250,000 people died in a deadly famine. In a report for Tufts University and the Rift Valley Institute, Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid examine the lessons arising from the international response to the famine in 2011 on how to prevent and mitigate a similar crisis."  

Key points from the paper:
- Early Warning was there despite some recent complains on the quality/reliability of the data. The failure points more to the humanitarian framework, that has a bias towards response rather than prevention/mitigation. How much is forecasting really integrated into planning and funding still remains to be seen, and as we have seen in previous papers, take up of forecasting is different by sector (El Nino oscillations) even if the potential positive preventive effects are quite high (Violence in Liberia). In some cases we do enter in a Chronic Early Warning that lead to an institutionalization of preparedness, mitigation and response (a humanitarian example is Haiti and the Hurricane Season), but I don't believe Somalia is there yet.
- Risk Management, Access... and of course Al-Shabaab. While Al-Shabaab's behavior (internal taxes and blocking of external aid) did exacerbate the crisis, the risk management mechanisms of international actors also limited the response. Reliance on local organizations of variable quality and allegiance coupled with limited direct implementation/monitoring capacity, has meant that many of the interventions were/are shaped by risk management rather that needs and effectiveness. 
- Us, us , us. Most of the discussions around the 2011 crisis are around the international response; yet, in a time were resilience is the buzzword of the day, very little attention is given to the Somali response and how it can be further strengthened. The paper also points out the reinforcement of marginalization for certain clans through the crisis (that further feeds into Somalia's instability by clan competition and Al-Shabaab comparative appeal).
 
Following Amartya Sen's thinking, we can say that famine is not a food failure but rather a political failure (in the wider sense of governance and allocation of resources).

Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia - Paper

Plenty of ink has been spilled about Al-Shabab and the Somali context (not that we notice much difference most of the time); Botha and Abdile's "Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia" look at one key organizational development component: Recruitment. Summary below.

"Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab’s rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government, countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab."

The study doesn't really offer a novel insight into Al-Shabab's recruitment, it is a much needed reminder that many core issues that fuel radicalization are still ongoing. 88 former fighters were interviewed (plus 7 off-the-record), therefore it remains to be seen if the fact that they are not fighting anymore may give us a biased sample. Nevertheless it is a valuable attempt. However, I would have preferred to include a "control" sample of Somalis that did not join Al-Shabab, this way we can compare if the reasons for joining are unique for this group or shared across Somalia: i.e. if economic reasons are given for joining (it is the leading reason), then how different are the people that joined to those that didn't (probably not much) and therefore how relevant it may be as a reason.

The study highlights the usual suspects and some interesting points:
- economic incentives as positions within Al-Shabab are remunerated (crime does pay), and many of them would see it as a career path.
- propaganda, specially the perception that Islam is under threat mixed with nationalism (Christians invading the country)
- Status/empowerment, specially for marginalized youth and minority clans. Al-Shabab represents respect. It is also able to provide a sense of belonging and a common purpose (that affects retention of recruits, although the money did help)
- Fear and anger as driving emotions for recruitment 
- Peer networks are the source of contact and not family networks. Many would join through a friend and rarely through a family member. Interesting point in a society where family/clan are so important, and maybe the breakdown of that relationship is a leading driver
- There remains a high trust on elders, even though much of Al-Shabab rhetoric and actions tend to undermine that structure. On the other hand they see government as self-interested and illegitimate, being revolt a necessary step.
- Regret (or lack of). Many of the former fighters regretted being caught, and not necessarily joining Al-Shabab (probably linked to the sense of belonging that the organization is able to impress)
- Intelligence. The ability of Al-Shabab to collect intelligence (and act upon it, orchestrating complex operations) has been recognized for a while. That ability is not only an operational asset but it probably also reinforces their capacity to identify and recruit individuals.

The recommendations of the study are pretty much standard (and oft repeated), and yet again barely followed.