Investigating El Niño‐Southern Oscillation and Society Relationships - Working Paper

"Investigating El Niño‐Southern Oscillation and Society Relationships" by Zebiak et al, looks into climate forecasting on three sectors: water, agriculture and health. It shows the role that forecasting can have as part of planning and response in areas that have large societal impact (beyond the extreme weather events associated in the media with El Niño or La Niña). Abstract:  

"Throughout at least the past several centuries, El Niño‐Southern Oscillation (ENSO) has played a significant role in human response to climate. Over time, increased attention on ENSO has led to a better understanding of both the physical mechanisms, and the environmental and societal consequences of the phenomenon. The prospects for seasonal climate forecasting emerged from ENSO studies, and were first pursued in ENSO studies. In this paper, we review ENSO's impact on society, specifically with regard to agriculture, water, and health; we also explore the extent to which ENSO‐related forecasts are used to inform decision making in these sectors. We find that there are significant differences in the uptake of forecasts across sectors, with the highest use in agriculture, intermediate use in water resources management, and the lowest in health. Forecast use is low in areas where ENSO linkages to climate are weak, but the strength of this linkage alone does not guarantee use. Moreover, the differential use of ENSO forecasts by sector shows the critical role of institutions that work at the boundary between science and society. In a long‐term iterative process requiring continual maintenance, these organizations serve to enhance the salience, credibility, and legitimacy of forecasts and related climate services."

ENSO studies started in the 80's with an important growth in the 90's that led to a better understanding of its consequences and also the development of forecasting tools. How have these tools translated into improved decision-making? By looking at three sectors that are affected by ENSO in a wider geographical area (from the Indian Ocean to the American continent, the authors show the different societal intake of forecasting tools.

Sectors that have previously used weather forecasting (like agriculture and water management) have been the ones that adapted ENSO modelling the most. Previous knowledge of similar tools allowed for users to be comfortable with the models and were conceptually more ready. Entering forecasting in sector that have not previously used it may require a tailored approach with simple quick wins over a longer period of time rather than complex models.

Institutions matter (a much repeated point in development literature), not only their presence (by using already established networks to distribute knowledge like agricultural extension) but also their design (focus on policy, research, awareness raising, best practice implementation, centralized vs decentralized, etc...). Tools have to be seen as relevant to the user, institutional design tell us not only the mandate or objectives but, maybe more importantly, who the user actually is.

Linked to the previous point, forecasts are a decision-making tools should help those making decisions. These seems obvious, but we have to remember that in many instances the users of forecasts are not the final beneficiaries of a decision. For example, a water management board makes decisions that affect water users by managing water flows. The forecasts itself will have to compete with other dynamics within the institution in order to be effective. On the other hand, in the case of agriculture, the farmer may be the recipient of the forecast, the decision-maker and the final beneficiary. That shortened decision-making process may help to explain why it is in agriculture where the uptake of ENSO forecasting tools has been the strongest as the incentives are aligned.

 

Whether we are interested in climate events or not, this paper does point out interesting issues on the usage of forecasting in different settings and sectors, and present lessons learnt that could be transferred to other sectors. Maybe the title is over-ambitious with the "society relationships" part.  

State Building and State Survival: Polynesia in the 19th Century - Working Paper

Kahler makes an interesting case in his paper "State Building and State Survival: Polynesia in the 19th Century", that arguably can also be made in current state building processes. Abstract:   

"Despite their small size and their eventual absorption into larger states or their colonial empires, five Polynesian societies -- Hawaii, Tonga, Samoa, Tahiti, and Aotearoa (the Maoris in what became New Zealand) provide a controlled comparison in the 19th century that extends our understanding of contemporary state building. Although all of these cases lost political independence by the end of the century, the timing and terms of their exit are significant. The process of building new political orders is considered in two stages. In the first phase to 1880, Tonga and Hawaii become recognized states. The other three polities were not recognized as states, and their autonomy and survival were undermined or ended. Pre-contact political formations largely explain these outcomes. A more hierarchical and centralized political endowment at contact offered advantages in the quest for empirical and normative statehood. In the second phase, from 1880 to 1990, Hawaii and Tonga pursued divergent strategies of state building in an increasingly harsh international environment. Hawaii was annexed by the United States; Tonga survived as a British protectorate, retaining much of its political and cultural autonomy. The strategies of state building that had won them recognition, liberal in the case of Hawaii and illiberal or regulated in the case of Tonga, produced different prospects for survival in a changing international environment. The Polynesian experience calls into question prevailing assumptions of contemporary state building by reasserting the importance of political formations that precede the modern state, re-evaluating the role of military conflict in state building, questioning the costs of liberal state building strategies for small states, and qualifying the role of international competition in sustaining or undermining the political autonomy of those states."

While the state building context is clearly different now that from the 19th century (for once the politics of conquest and annexation are not as readily accepted) and also the Polynesia societies are geographically and historically different; nevertheless there are some learnings to take from this historical process (aside from finding more about Polynesian societies).

The author identifies five key findings:

-  Pre-contact political and social structures: the lack of a centralized and hierarchical polity pre-contact is determinant in future (or lack of) state-building. That political structure was most successful when it was able to control or capture the resources used in exchange with international actors. Those resource then would be used in the nascent state. The model of the state was the European one, not so dissimilar from the current model of state beign advocated. This model, when forced upon societies without a foundation of hierarchical political power, would in turn increase political divisions and violent conflict. The policy lesson for current state-building would be to either accept an evolving or more decentralized model for countries without historical centralization, or focus on the building of a political hierarchy before forcing down a top-down model

- Warfare: the relatively small role that warfare played in state building in Polynesia. Instead indigenous state building relayed on demilitarization through coalition building, on the other hand, while producing peace dividend this process further weakened this structures in comparison with encroaching external powers (moreover the technological gap was increasing by the day in the 19th century). Samoa and Maoris did manage to present military resistance to Europeans (in the case of Maori quite successfully) but failed to promote a unified and hierarchical political structure. Coalition building rather that military success may be a more successful strategy for state building (although a measure of military capacity may be needed as a deterrent)

 - The cost of liberal state building: Here the experience of Hawaii and Tonga is compared. Hawaii followed many of the liberal advise of US missionaries that allowed the kingdom to integrate in the global economy and develop a prosperous plantation sector. However this steps proved to be incompatible with a sovereign Hawaiian state, led to high economic dependency to foreigners and  increased the ethnic division of population. On the other hand, Tonga led a 'illiberal' policy where 'unity and independence' were paramount by restricting the market, political participation and religious liberty.
- Property rights: Again there is a comparison between Hawaii and Tonga. Private property rights are usually seen as an important ingredient for growth, and in the case of Hawaii it lead to a productive plantation economy. Unfortunately this productivity growth was led by settlers and had negative effects on the well being and autonomy of the local population. Tonga had a different approach, with an egalitarian policy of land tenure, that further reinforced the role of the state as the guarantor of those rights.
- International competition: The fifth and final point looks at the role of external actors, specially competing powers. If there is too little competition there is the danger that an external power would be unrestrained, if there is to much competition the risk is preemptive interventions (to stop other power taking over), a moderate competition that can allow the nascent states balance powers out would be 'ideal'. While international norms on conquest and annexation are not the same nowadays as in the 19th century, powers (both global and regional) still influence, intervene and interfere in processes within fragile states. Too much of that influence will hamper the state building process.

While being aware of the specific context both historically and geographically, this is nevertheless food for thought for the current state building processes.