Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan - Article

Us, development types, rarely look at the military's experience in stabilization and counterinsurgency (COIN). It is unfortunate because many of the dynamics and constrains they face are not that dissimilar from our work in Community Driven Recovery and local peacebuilding. Briggs' article "Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A case study of counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan" is a case in point where cross-learning may be of use.

Abstract

"This article provides a critical analysis of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan at the tactical level. The efforts of several Naval Special Warfare detachments deployed to Naw Bahar district in Zabul Province, Afghanistan are examined in detail to identify key successes and failures in planning and execution. It defines the operating environment in which the detachments worked and identifies the goals and outcomes of the first and second phases of the counterinsurgency effort. The article concludes by placing the tactical effort in the context of the overall strategy in Afghanistan and suggests that time is the limiting factor to success"

Key take-away notes.

Know your context: Tribal governance, relations with both insurgents and central government, and conflicts within the district are key to understand what is going on.

Population? which population?: COIN claims that is population centric, and that is fair enough. However, as the article points out, the center of gravity regarding insurgency in the district was actually not at the district center. We tend to focus on visible sources of 'power' like concentration of houses, markets or official buildings around which we build our activities... and while this locations may serve multiple purposes for the community, it may not be as relevant for the issue at hand (be that counterinsurgency or building a water well). Also depending on how we define population (and their representatives) we run the risk of mis-identifying or ignoring key stakeholders.

Local Economy: While local sourcing seems like a great idea, in practice it can lead to inflation and higher costs for local population (let alone dependence). How external resources are injected into a local economy is very important.

Governance: There are already governance mechanisms in place, however many of the linkages are broken and are a source of mistrust and conflict. Reestablishing those links, specially around dispute/grievance resolution, dialogue and information flow is paramount.

While this article per se is not telling us much new (if I were to venture a guess, the major outcome of this is bonus points for the author for publishing), even from the military point of view (how relevant is Naval Special Warfare to the article, I still don't know); it also highlights common issues that we encounter in conflict or post-conflict areas. This requires us to design and implement with very context-based lens (that allegedly we already do!!). 

The article also shows that the military, like the development business, keeps reinventing the wheel time after time... but that is whole different debate regarding organizational learning, mission setting and leadership.

 

 

Getting teachers back to the classroom. A systematic review on what works to improve teacher attendance in developing countries - Paper

Education remains one of key pillars of development, and indicators like literacy rate and school attendance are regularly used as a measure. "Getting teachers back to the classroom. A systematic review on what works to improve teacher attendance in developing countries" by Guerrero et al, looks more specifically at one component of education: teacher attendance.

Abstract

"This article reports on a systematic review of research on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at increasing teacher attendance in developing countries. After a comprehensive search process, nine studies met the inclusion criteria. Pooled effects sizes of included studies were estimated (with the exception of three studies that had unavailable information to calculate their effect sizes). Results show that direct interventions coupling monitoring systems with incentives and indirect interventions involving the community and parents in students’ education had statistically significant effects on teacher attendance, suggesting that close monitoring and attractive incentives are mechanisms of high potential to reduce teacher absenteeism".

To note that this paper looks at a very limited set of studies (9), as it only reviews rigorous impact evaluations within their parameters. The findings themselves are not groundbreaking and fairly intuitive: both direct and indirect interventions have a positive effect. Those that already following educational issues will not be surprised, but it may be useful as a quick overview on teacher attendance for newcomers.

Probably the most interesting fact is that they could not link teacher attendance and student achievement (although the study was not specifically looking at that). While school may have other social benefits (i.e. socialization, keeping youth contained), the main stated objective is educational outcome. However, increased teacher attendance does not necessarily lead to improved educational outcomes. Probably the leading advocate these days on this issue is Lant Pritchett, but also others have highlighted time and again the disconnect between educational inputs (focus on teachers,  buildings, materials) and actual educational outcomes.

How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation - Paper

Although both ISIL and Boko Haram have recently taken the spotlight, the Al Qaeda franchise remains a recognizable actor. Hellmich's paper "How Islamic is al-Qaeda? The politics of Pan-Islam and the challenge of modernisation" looks into Ben Laden's ideology and how it fits into the wider contemporary Islamic discourse.

Abstract

"This article investigates the contested ideology of al-Qaeda through an analysis of Osama bin Ladin’s writings and public statements issued between 1994 and 2011, set in relation to the development of Islamic thought and changing socio-political realities in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Challenging popular conceptions of Wahhabism and the “Salafi jihad”, it reveals an idealistic, Pan-Islamic sentiment at the core of his messages that is not based on the main schools of Islamic theology, but is the result of a crisis of meaning of Islam in the modern world. Both before and after the death of al-Qaeda’s iconic leader, the continuing process of religious, political and intellectual fragmentation of the Muslim world has led to bin Ladin’s vision for unity being replaced by local factions and individuals pursuing their own agendas in the name of al-Qaeda and Islam."

The demise of the Ottoman Empire (and the sense of unity it carried), secularism/modernization and the expansion of literacy have opened up the Muslim world to an internal crisis/revolution. As individual Muslims increasingly interpret Islam for themselves, without making reference to the traditional schools of Sunni law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii or Hanbali) a divergence within develops. Pan-Islamism, with its core message of Muslim solidarity and the unity of umma, is the message that Ben Laden would send over the world. The appeal he represented was not a radical political/religious ideology (the actual political structure of the future is quite vague) but a social message of solidarity, personal responsibility and victimhood that many Muslims could relate to.

Even before Ben Laden's death, we could see the fragmentation of Al Qaeda along more locally driven agendas under the banner of global action.The fact that most of the victims of Al Qaeda are actually Muslims, the increase fighting along sectarian lines and the more limited objectives of affiliates and franchises show the drift away from Pan-Islamism. Although the rhetoric remains important in order to appeal for funds, foreign fighters and support from the Muslim community, what remains, to paraphrase the known sentence about politics, is that 'all insurgencies are local'. While Al Qaeda's position in the global ranking has diminished, some of the root causes for its appeal are still current and part of the ongoing debate within the Muslim world.

Drivers of Entrepreneurship and Post-Entry Performance of Newborn Firms in Developing Countries - Working Paper

Quatraro and Vivarelli offer us a review of the latest research in "Drivers of Entrepreneurship and Post-Entry Performance of Newborn Firms in Developing Countries", that I believe bring some interesting questions around livelihoods and local economic development and also tags along nicely to my previous post on "Non-Farm Enterprises"

Abstract:     

"The aim of this paper is to provide an updated survey of the "state of the art" in entrepreneurial studies with a particular focus on developing countries (DCs). In particular, the concept of "entrepreneurship" is critically discussed, followed by a discussion of the institutional, macroeconomic, and microeconomic conditions that affect the entry of new firms and the post-entry performance of newborn firms. The reviewed literature bears some policy implications for the support of the creation new firms, such as the targeting of policy measures to prospective entrepreneurs who possess high education levels, long previous job experience, and innovative skills. Specifically, for DCs, tailored subsidies and support should be coupled with framework and infrastructural policies that are able to improve the business environment such that new ventures can start and grow."

Findings of relevance for programming are:
- Minimum Efficient Scale (Size matters). Risk of failure dramatically drops once it gets to its MES. Programming could be built around benchmarks like MES that allow for reallocation of resources towards more at risk business, instead of a fixed/same across the board timeline. This would also imply that each business may have a different growth objective/requirement (and not just slightly above break even) depending on the sector.
- Previous experience in the sector. While this may seem an obvious, sometimes selection criteria for interventions are based on needs rather than chances of success. Programme design has to be clear on what is aiming for (temporary relief or longer term livelihood) and act accordingly. 
- Financial. Credit constrains may have been overplayed as an obstacle to enterprise survival and maybe the focus should be more on savings rather than borrowing. Microfinance user may actually using it in that manner, as some studies have shown negative returns (they may actually be losing money) but positive savings (they save money in comparison with the previous situation). There is an increasing shift towards savings but the rethoric still remains around credit constrains.
- Education is a mixed bag. Higher level education reduces the chances of starting up, probably because the first preference is salaried labour (and seeking to avoid defensive entrepreneurship) that education gives access to. On the other hand, education is a high predictor of business growth and survival. It is interesting to note that there is a "threshold effect" depending on context/location, were there is a minimum level of education that leads to faster growth. Being able to identify that level for the target area may help in yielding better results. Then again we encounter the issue of selection criteria and programming priorities.
- Unemployment is negatively correlated with enterprise survival. Previous unemployment increases the risk of failure and tends to be linked to lower economic outcomes and job creation. Much programming is built around entrepreneurship for unemployed youth, wouldn't it be better to have a two staged/tiered system where unemployed would initially be waged labour (and gaining sector experience at the same time) before start-up is considered?
- Minorities. I am troubled with their recommendation of specific support to entrepreneurial minorities. While this may make sense from an economic point of view (building on an existing strength), the political and social risks of such actions can be large. Business minorities have been violently targeted even in recent times, and a policy that singles them out in a sector they may already have a comparative advantage will only fuel negative perceptions.

   

Interesting links

Latest round of interesting articles:

- Separatism meets Charter Cities, in Sardinia via Switzerland

- Missionary printing presses in Africa and contemporary newspaper readership

- Privilege and higher interest rates in the Ottoman Empire

The Second Wave of Independence: Shopping for Solutions - Working Paper

From time to time there is a paper that aims at the foundational dynamics of the development industry, this time it is Gaarder and Bartsch's "The Second Wave of Independence: Shopping for Solutions"
Abstract:     

"In the 21st century, many developing countries will become emerging markets and will no longer be in need of the carrot-and-stick approach to development assistance most prevalent today: development financing made available conditional on certain policies and interventions. This paper suggests that interactions between development agencies and recipient governments are mostly about inputs deemed (but not known) to contribute to improvements in living standards in recipient countries, rather than outcomes. The paper argues that the development marketplace is beset by market imperfections because of externalities, principal-agent problems, and decision making under uncertainty, which not only make it difficult to achieve the right outcomes, but also take away incentives to learn about outcomes. A fundamental rethink of responsibilities and accountabilities in the development business would make sure that development outcomes are traded in the development marketplace. It would put recipient countries in charge of contracting development agencies to provide these outcomes. Development agencies would commit to and be held financially accountable for outcomes, that is, real improvements in welfare indicators. The paper describes the role of the evaluation function in aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives and provides examples of emerging solutions."

 

The authors use an economic analysis of the interaction of development agencies, donor and recipient countries, identifying three key issues (market imperfections):

- Externalities. The focus on inputs (funds, resources) and outputs (stuff built, people trained, gadgets distributed) instead of outcomes (improved health, better access) creates a singular kind of externality, not as an unintended consequence but rather an acknowledged but not fully included in the transaction

- Principal-Agent. A classic issue in economics literature, the misalignment of interests between the contracting parties, compounded by the fact that they are entering the agreement on behalf of third parties (be that recipient's poor or donor's rich)

- Uncertainty. In many cases we don't have strong evidence that an specific intervention in a given context will bring the stated outcomes. Theories of change are full of assumptions of assumptions that are unable to address causal relationships, specially within the timelines that many development projects operate

The proposed solution is to internalize the externalities by a tendering process focused on outcomes. The recipient country would contract out the delivery of outcomes to the development agency. This would create an interesting dynamic in relations between development actors and recipient countries... however it requires some assumptions and does raise some questions. While the Principal-Agent issue is sorted in one part of the equation, it still remains that the recipient country in representing the final set of beneficiaries. It also requires an alignment of interest between donor and recipient, and the internal governance of the recipient... or rather, how is the contractee (development agency) is going to interact with different parts of the recipient country that may not have been party to the original negotiation. In an input-ouput model it is easier to deal with institutions as they can be co-opted with more tangible things.

Also the paper tends to make loans and grants equal, while the negotiation dynamics would clearly be different if repayment is on the table or not. I also have trouble defining as donor a provider of a loan, but that may be a personal issue.

Finally there is a call for more rigorous evaluation and improvement of M&E. On face value it is a winning formula, and it would be hard to argue against, but at the same time it feels like the common opt-out 'more research is required'. I would say the key issue is not necessarily M&E but rather to be clear (and humble) on both the intervention objectives and the learning outcomes. RCT is not the magic wand that will answer all the questions.

A good read that keeps the discussion open, whether you agree with the authors or not.

Calculating Bandits: Quasi-Corporate Governance and Institutional Selection in Autocracies - Working Paper

Following the bandit theme (from the stationary bandits in Congo), this time formal 'bandits' in "Calculating Bandits: Quasi-Corporate Governance and Institutional Selection in Autocracies" by Salter and Hall. While my (economic) Austrian-ness is limited, this is an interesting attempt to explain successful autocratic economies, not through a developmental state but rather through a firm-like approach (rent maximization)

Abstract:  "This paper applies the logic of economic calculation to the actions of autocrats. We model autocrats as stationary bandits who use profit and loss calculations to select institutions that maximize their extraction rents. We find in many cases autocrats achieve rent maximization through creating and protecting private property rights. This in turn yields high levels of production, with expropriation kept low enough to incentivize continued high production. Importantly, while this leads to increasing quantities of available goods and services over time, it does not lead to true development; i.e. the coordination of consumer demand with producer supply through directing resources to their highest-valued uses. We apply our model to the authoritarian governments of Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, showing how they function as quasi-corporate governance organizations in the business of maximizing appropriable rents"

There is a clear selection bias, they explicitly choose two successful examples (Singapore and UAE). It would have been better if they would have also presented a failed case of quasi-corporate autocracy to show institutional design paths (instead of using Kuwait as a comparison, that is probably not a random choice). 
Are we explaining away two outliers or a potential 'second-best' (third-best?) model for short/medium run economic success?
The authors do acknowledge some of the shortcomings of the paper, but I think they would have been better served by keeping it in draft form or as a discussion hypothesis as it feels like a weak case so far (case study development, comparative strength, testing the theory beyond two cases). Nevertheless, this feeds into a wider discussion of state formation and its role, institution design and political economy.