UNHCR Policy on Alternatives to Camps - Finally!!

There are few times that a change in policy by a UN Agency can have (potentially) such far reaching impact. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has changed its Policy on Alternatives to Camps:
 
"UNHCR's policy is to pursue alternatives to camps, whenever possible, while ensuring that refugees are protected and assisted effectively and are able to achieve solutions.... [it] applies in all UNHCR operations and in all phases of displacement from contingency planning and preparedness to emergency response to stable and protracted refugee situations and the pursuit of durable solutions"

Camps are no more (in theory) the go-to response to a refugee crisis. Of course this doesn't mean that camps will completely disappear, but the incentive to campasize  the refugees will decrease.  
This has been a policy change long time in the making, but why that long? Here different actors (governments, politicians, UNHCR, NGOs, gatekeepers, etc..) have different incentives to promote the establishment of camps, and in many cases in contradiction with the potential long term solution.

Visibility: Camps are very visible and they can easily represent the misery (to attract funds and resources) and the success (to show the providers of funds what has been done). A non-camp setting is much less visible, and sometimes indistinguishable from the host population (specially urban poor). Camps offer extremely "good" and "appealing" photo ops!
Population: If it is a refugee camp, then the population of the camp is refugee (not always the case thou). It makes it easier to identify and target the "beneficiaries, but also to contain and control their movements.
Logistics: It is way more convenient to deliver products and services to a clearly identified population in a single point.
Control: Managing a camp also implies controlling the flow of resources, something that applies not only to gatekeepers and governments but also to NGOs. It is much harder to control the flow of resources to a disperse population. The control is not only of inputs, but also of outputs, the refugees themselves can see their own movements curtailed.
Beacon: For the refugees it becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy; because the resources are provided at camps, they move to camps, hence the resources go to camps. Camps "attract" refugees.
Security: In some situations, specially in conflict, camps offer the security of the group and also the visibility for other actors to protect them. However collective security does not mean personal security as the breakdown of social norms, trauma and other displacement related issues may lead to an increase of sexual and gender based violence, abuse and exploitation.
Political: Camps can create a captive (and sometimes powerful) constituency to further political agendas around ethnic grievances, discrimination, statehood, revenge, victimization or access to resources. While the grievances and political agendas may very well be real and felt, the camp setting perpetuates a protracted conflict and is rarely conducive to a durable solution.

Therefore, while camps may be an expedient tool for the actors responding to the crisis, it may be more efficient to deliver in emergency situations and provide a valuable transition point for vulnerable populations. They have also proved inefficient by creating parallel systems for the delivery of services, furthering dependency of the camp to external providers (magnifying the impact of decrease interest and funding from donors) and furthering a divisive separation between refugees and host populations. Refugees themselves have limited opportunity for alternative livelihoods, freedom of movement and choice and self-reliance in camp setting, Camps do play a role in refugee crisis, but the main focus of the response should be the refugees and not a location.