How Powerful is Rouhani in the Islamic Republic? - Research Paper

Iran's Nuclear talks have recently been extended, whether because Rouhani's engagement or the late rapprochement between USA and Iran due to Daesh/ISIL still remains to be seen. Bastani's "How Powerful is Rouhani in the Islamic Republic?" has a look at the power dynamics within the Iranian government around two key points: President Rouhani's standing vis a vis Supreme Leader Khamenei, and secondly the how the nuclear talks shape does dynamics.

This is an interesting paper that reminds us that while leadership is important, aligning interest groups (in a wider sense) and coalition building are fundamental for actual policy change.

Introduction

"One of the key questions being asked about the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme is how powerful President Hassan Rouhani really is within Iran’s unique political system. In other words, in a country where the key power-holder is the Supreme Leader, do Rouhani and his colleagues have the ability to advance their agenda and implement an international nuclear agreement despite their powerful opponents? This question is of particular importance because during the presidency of pro-reform Mohammad Khatami, Rouhani was in charge of the nuclear talks and reached an important arrangement with the international community, suspending uranium enrichment and opening nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections; a few years later, however, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was unhappy with the attitude of the Western powers towards Iran, halted the implementation of these arrangements.

With this historical perspective in mind, an examination of the balance of power in Iran under Rouhani’s presidency, and a review of the tools at his disposal and those in the hands of his powerful rivals, is critical. This paper examines Rouhani’s chief priorities in the domestic and foreign domains; analyses the factors that help, and those that impede, his administration in attaining its goals; and assesses the relationship between the president and Iran’s other institutions of power, including his influence on the country’s security apparatus. Finally, the effects of the possible success and failure of the Rouhani administration, particularly in respect of the nuclear dossier as its most important priority, will be examined.

It should be noted that the focus of this paper is on the power balance within the Iranian regime. An examination of the role of the elite and of the discontented masses in the overall picture would require a separate study"

Summary from the paper below the fold

The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development - Paper

Institutions have become the buzzword in development int the past decade, more and more books, articles and Noble Prices go to the field of study where culture and economics interact. Tamanaha's paper "The Knowledge and Policy Limits of New Institutional Economics on Development" wades into the debate by not only highlighting the different interpretations of 'institution' but also the limits that this new institutionalist drive encounters.

Abstract:     

"New Institutional Economics (NIE) has secured impressive achievements in academia and policy circles. The World Bank and other development organization in the past two decades have expended billions of dollars on efforts to build “good governance” and the “rule of law” informed by the NIE theory that economic development requires supportive political and legal institutions. NIE appears to be the new consensus view of development thinking, supplanting the neo-liberal Washington Consensus that dominated global development policy in the 1980s and 1990s. NIE scholars interested in development are currently engaged in an effort to map and measure the institutional terrain with the expressed purpose of producing policy advice on how to improve economic performance through institutional reform.

This essay elaborates on the barriers that stand in the way of the knowledge and policy goals of NIE. Foremost is the “interconnectedness of society:” cultural, technological, legal, political, and economic activities all affect one another and are affected by one another, often in ways that are subtle and all but invisible; each situation unique in its constellation of social forces and is dynamic, constantly changing in reaction to surrounding influences. To show why these aspects cannot be overcome by NIE scholars, I explore the ongoing struggle to identify a shared conception of “institution” — and I explain why this cannot be solved. For reasons I go on to elaborate, NIE scholars also will not be able to get a precise grip on the surrounding institutional influences that affect economic development. This incapacity shows up time and again in NIE research. The same barriers that stand in the way of knowledge also promise to stymie the policy ambitions of NIE scholars who seek to promote economic development. NIE scholars today, it turns out, are repeating lessons announced five decades ago in the law and development field. The problems were insuperable then and will remain so. Owing to these barriers, little advice can be offered beyond commonsense recommendations — pay attention to local circumstances, experiment to find out what works, don’t apply a “one size fits all” model. Interconnectedness, dynamism, and uniqueness are behind this advice. While critical of NIE knowledge and policy objectives, this essay is not negative in orientation. NIE research is illuminating. Greater awareness of the limits will help orient future work in the field in the most fruitful directions."

 

I am not so sure NIE has fully supplanted the Washington Consensus, but it is true that the language around development has shifted towards governance, institutions, rule of law and the like. Whether this represents a larger shift in global thinking remains to be seen, as many discussions around global economic social and political relations are still stuck in the old paradigm (i.e. austerity, organized crime, migration)... and these have as much impact (or more) on development than the development sector itself. While NIE does acknowledge the importance of informal institutions, the greater focus on formal/legal ones does a disservice to the discipline and undermines its utility for practitioners.

The author also points out something that anybody coming into economics from another academic area realizes really quick: economic tools are very, very abstract and inadequate to deal with actual social dynamics. While there is more interest in behavioral economics and other attempts to bridge that gap, there is always a nagging feeling that economists are reinventing the wheel and catching up with discussions that other subject had, at least, a couple of decades ago.

Overall the paper is a good primer on where New Institutional Economics is and the debate on what an institution is.

Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups - Paper

Thurber's "Militias as sociopolitical movements: Lessons from Iraq's armed Shia groups" highlights the issue of labels and trying to fit everything into an specific world view does not actually help in understanding conflict dynamics, or state formation/legitimacy for that matter. This paper can be read together with the previously commented "Organization and Community: Determinants of Insurgent Military Effectiveness"

Abstract

"The Shia militia has emerged as one of the most powerful and important actors in the Middle East security environment. Despite this trend, they remain poorly understood by scholars and policymakers alike. This article seeks to expand our understanding of the militia as a type of non-state armed group through an examination of Shia militia movements in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. More than simply warlords, paramilitaries, or foreign proxies, Shia militias in Iraq enjoyed substantial popular legitimacy, pursued a broad social and political agenda, and participated actively in the formal institutions of the state. Understanding the triangular relationship between the militia, the state, and the population is essential in explaining the rise and fall of the Shia militias during the US occupation as well as in developing strategies to deal with their most recent resurgence"

By labeling militias as warlords, paramilitaries or foreign proxies (or terrorist, if it fits the political agenda), we are simplifying the role that some of them play. While historically some militias have been part of statebuilding process, the view nowadays is that they are rather an indicator of state's weakness and lack of full sovereignty. As the author points out, militias with a strong sociopolitical foundation do have a representational/political role to play on behalf their communities. Instead of dealing with them just with military means, a wider approach that takes into account the community aspirations is much needed. Hence, sociopolitical militias life cycle is part of an ebb and flow of relations between the state and the community: when the state addresses community needs, then the militia weakens. However, if the state is weak, the militia gains importance as provider of security and social services. The paradox comes when the militia replaces the state, as they tend to over-reach (abuse of violence, fundamentalist policies, lack of adequate checks and balances) and increase the discontent among the community (breaking the internal coalition of support), therefore bringing another militia or the state back into play. From this perspective, militia's strengths and structure as an opposition group does not prepare it for a governing role.

I find interesting that the author's focus on the Shia seems to sideline the fact that a similar dynamics of Sunni sociopolitical militias might be growing in response to the Shia preponderance within the government and the role of Shia militias.

The paper also gives an interesting primer on Iraq Shia dynamics. I thought there were only two Sadrs, but if fact there are three. 

Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan - Paper

The term 'fragile state' has become common currency in development circles since 9/11, especially as seen through a security lens as shown by Barakat and Larson's  "Fragile States: A Donor-serving Concept? Issues with Interpretations of Fragile Statehood in Afghanistan".  

Abstract

"Current conceptions and models of fragile statehood in conflict-affected contexts can serve the purposes of international donor governments over and above reconstruction and statebuilding. First, despite remaining ill-defined, the fragile state concept is widely utilized by donors to oversimplify analysis of complex political environments, such as that of Afghanistan, leading to inadequate bureaucratic responses. Second, current models of fragile statehood are unable to capture contextual or temporal dynamics, and invariably omit the contribution of international intervention to entrenching fragility. This is particularly the case in Afghanistan where the effects of international militarized stabilization responses have not been systematically included in fragility assessments, leading to increased insecurity. This article calls for a more nuanced approach to fragility and greater acknowledgement of the role donor governments can play in its entrenchment."

The underlying assumption of fragility in which weak central government = terrorism/regional contagion has meant that much of the focus has been centered on security responses. Moreover, the definition of fragility also assumes a definition of state (termed Weberian by the authors) that does not necessarily match the affected populations view. Fragility as a concept is very anchored in a nation-state system, in which it is both undermined (by acknowledging that the central government is not fully sovereign/legitimate) and reinforced (by making statebuilding around the central government).

Is the concept actually useful for anything? the label helps donors frame priorities by highlighting the sense of impending doom, crisis-prone, destabilizing the status quo and bringing a yet new haven for terrorist and criminals. However, from the 'recipient' point of view, this label is barely helpful (aside from bringing extra donor funds) as it tends to focus more on the container (the visible role of the state) rather than the content (the underlying political economy and cultural/social dynamics that may be the source of that weakness)

The authors, by using the case of Afghanistan, also put forth the claim that international assistance, by the way the understand and address this concept, are actually promoting fragility rather than diminishing. It is interesting how both donor and development community are promoting bottom-up (Community Driven Recovery) and top-down (Statebuilding) in parallel with a vague hope that they will meet at some point in the middle rather than acknowledging that fragile states are in that situation because of an ongoing multilevel societal crisis that may not fit the ready-made nation state model.

                 

Interesting links

Recent interesting articles:

- Mathematically defining Hipsters?

- How can Scandinavian countries tax so much? 

- Distance to the equator and economic development, explanation for the reversal of fortunes? 

- Compensating civilians during war, individual victims under International Law?

Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia?: Learning from the 2011 famine - Interim Paper

An interesting paper looking at the 2011 Somalia crisis, Maxwell and Majid's "Another Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia?: Learning from the 2011 famine" goes straight to the point. An easy read that serves also as a primer for humanitarian dynamics in the country.

Intro:
"In July 2014, humanitarian agencies and the government of Somalia warned of a new severe drought in Somalia, only three years after more than 250,000 people died in a deadly famine. In a report for Tufts University and the Rift Valley Institute, Daniel Maxwell and Nisar Majid examine the lessons arising from the international response to the famine in 2011 on how to prevent and mitigate a similar crisis."  

Key points from the paper:
- Early Warning was there despite some recent complains on the quality/reliability of the data. The failure points more to the humanitarian framework, that has a bias towards response rather than prevention/mitigation. How much is forecasting really integrated into planning and funding still remains to be seen, and as we have seen in previous papers, take up of forecasting is different by sector (El Nino oscillations) even if the potential positive preventive effects are quite high (Violence in Liberia). In some cases we do enter in a Chronic Early Warning that lead to an institutionalization of preparedness, mitigation and response (a humanitarian example is Haiti and the Hurricane Season), but I don't believe Somalia is there yet.
- Risk Management, Access... and of course Al-Shabaab. While Al-Shabaab's behavior (internal taxes and blocking of external aid) did exacerbate the crisis, the risk management mechanisms of international actors also limited the response. Reliance on local organizations of variable quality and allegiance coupled with limited direct implementation/monitoring capacity, has meant that many of the interventions were/are shaped by risk management rather that needs and effectiveness. 
- Us, us , us. Most of the discussions around the 2011 crisis are around the international response; yet, in a time were resilience is the buzzword of the day, very little attention is given to the Somali response and how it can be further strengthened. The paper also points out the reinforcement of marginalization for certain clans through the crisis (that further feeds into Somalia's instability by clan competition and Al-Shabaab comparative appeal).
 
Following Amartya Sen's thinking, we can say that famine is not a food failure but rather a political failure (in the wider sense of governance and allocation of resources).

Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls - Paper

'Hearts and Minds' is a much used term in counterinsurgency discussions, originating from a now famous sentence by Gerald Templar on the Malayan Emergency. The battle for local public opinion becoming as important, or more, as military operations. Cohen puts that assumption to the test in "Just How Important Are ‘Hearts and Minds’ Anyway? Counterinsurgency Goes to the Polls" by analyzing local perceptions during three conflicts: Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
 
Abstract

"Despite all the talk of ‘hearts and minds’ being the key to counterinsurgency, local public opinion is rarely studied and when it is, it often yields surprising conclusions. Through analyzing polling data from Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, this article shows that public opinion is less malleable, more of an effect rather than a cause of tactical success, and a poor predictor of strategic victory. As a result, modern counterinsurgency doctrine’s focus on winning popular support may need to be rethought"

What the paper shows is that changes of perception actually follow and are not a precursor to effective military operations, even more, in some cases those changes in public opinion do lag behind in time even if important improvements in security have taken place (by objective indicators). While it has always been difficult to measure both psychological warfare and 'hearts and minds' approaches in times of conflict, the author's analysis does indicate the need, at least, of successful military operations/outcomes in order to turn public opinion. However, I do find the interpretation of 'hearts and minds' somewhat restrictive as it goes beyond the media/community engagement part of it and also includes how military operations are conducted (specially in relation to the community). Also the criticism against the concept of 'uncommitted third' (the section of the population sitting on the fence between two contenders) feels more of nitpicking (should it be the 'uncommitted fourth' or 'fifth'?) rather than actually making the case against it. The fact (even as per the polling analyzed by the author) that there is a section of the population that over time changes alignments and allegiances (whether previously committed or not) has been shown in each human conflict. The 'uncommitted third' concept at the end of the day is a simplification of the acceptance that there is a dynamic environment and competition for the space.

'Hearts and Minds' strategist may have fallen into their own rhetoric by allowing their perceptions shape reality. Maybe they have become a case of successful 'hearts and minds', where the behavior is changed by the mind rather than force. In my opinion, this doesn't undermine 'hearts and minds' as a concept but rather show the difficulty of a full understanding and implementation. Finding the balance between the coercing and convincing is not easy, and, as the study shows, maybe there has to be some coercing before the convincing works.